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This dissertation examines impacts of product information and environmental 
events on individual behavior and the economy. This is done using a causal inference 
econometric approach, an eye-tracking laboratory experiment, and scenario forecasting.  
The first essay evaluates the effects of unit-based pricing (UBP) of municipal solid 
waste and a mandatory recycling (MR) policy on waste reduction, recycling, and illegal 
waste dumping in Taiwan. The results suggest that the UBP policy curbed the quantity of 
unsorted waste and increased disposal of biodegradable waste but did not significantly 
increase the quantity of recycling. In contrast, the MR policy boosted biodegradable waste 
and recycling but did not necessarily decrease the amount of unsorted waste. The UBP 
policy also stimulated a temporary increase in illegal dumping.  
The second essay applies an eye-tracking experiment to investigate how 
consumers react to honey product origin, adulteration, and review information. The 
experimental results suggest that the certified local honey seal and honey adulteration 
information independently raise WTP for local honey but do not interact to jointly raise 
WTP. The results also show that negative honey product reviews cause a much larger 
reduction in WTP than the increase produced by positive reviews.  
The third essay reports on an investigation of how rice yield increases over time 
are influenced by climate, CO2 fertilization, and research investment. To allow 
identification of CO2 effects, the study integrates FAO reported yield data with data from 




increasing atmospheric CO2 concentration has made a significant contribution to rice 
yield increases, amounting to about 52% of the observed rice yield growth. The result also 
shows that increasing precipitation and temperature cause reductions in rice yields, 
implying that CO2 mitigation and climate change are yield growth depressing factors. On 
the other hand, the result indicates that research investments increase yields, and this 
finding raises a potential need for more investment in agricultural research and 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
The economy, market information, and the environment are interconnected and jointly 
affect each other. Costs associated with economic growth and product adulteration are 
often neglected. Failing to identify negative externalities and lower quality products could 
lead to unsustainable and inefficient growth plus food safety issues. Thus, identifying the 
effectiveness of environment and market information policies is needed to safeguard the 
environment and maintain a beneficial and safe economy. 
Studying the economic effect of environmental policies/practices, market information 
and environmental characteristics helps address the above problem but can be a 
challenging task. Because of the nature of observational data and limits of statistical 
analyses of human behavior, empirical economic studies oftentimes contain potentially 
biased estimation results due to at least one confounding or endogenous variable that is 
correlated with unobserved factors. One way to address the confounding concern is to 
conduct controlled experiments, but these are usually expensive and not always feasible 
plus can be difficult to cover real word market situations. Alternatively, causal inference 
using econometric techniques with appropriate identification assumptions and scenario 
forecasting can also provide useful insights (Bessler and Palma 2018). 
This dissertation reports on studies of the causal impacts of environmental and market 
developments through three independent essays.  This is done by separately applying a 




observational and experimental data-based econometric estimation coupled with scenario 
forecasting.  In particular, 
• The first essay reports on an evaluation of the effects of municipal waste 
policies on residents’ waste disposal behavior.  Specifically, the chapter 
reports on an investigation of the effects of unit-based pricing (UBP) of 
municipal solid waste and mandatory recycling (MR) policies as they impact 
the volume of waste disposal, waste recycling, and illegal waste dumping in 
Taiwan.  
• The second essay reports on an eye-tracking experiment that explored how 
consumers react to quality and point of origin information on honey products 
in terms of their willingness-to-pay.  
• The third essay reports on an analysis done regarding the effects of climate, 
CO2 fertilization, and research investment on Asian rice yield productivity. 
Figure I-1 demonstrates the dissertation framework on the applied economic research 
validity spectrum. The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: the three essays are 
presented in chapters II, III, and IV, respectively. Finally, the conclusion section in chapter 
V summarizes the main findings and contributions from this work. 
 




CHAPTER II  
WASTE REDUCTION AND WASTE SPILLOVERS: EVIDENCE FROM UNIT-
BASED PRICING OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN TAIWAN1 
II.1 Introduction 
A poorly-designed waste management system can have negative impacts on the 
environment, human health, and biodiversity. Eighty percent of the world’s projected 
population is anticipated to reside in cities and have sufficient disposable income to 
generate significant volumes of waste, necessitating advances in waste management 
(Wilson et al. 2015). Wilson et al. (2015) forecast a global population of 46% more than 
today by the end of the 21st century meaning the waste volume and associated disposal 
issue will certainly grow over time.  
Policy needs to confront the growing waste disposal issue. Traditionally, waste 
management strategies have relied on command and control (C&C) approaches which set 
specific laws/standards on waste handling, recycling and disposal behavior. Examples of 
C&C policies are mandatory recycling (MR) or mandatory sorting practices.  
Alternatively, policy makers have used unit-based pricing (UBP) policies (a.k.a pay-
as-you-throw) which charges residents a per-unit waste disposal fee coupled with 
recycling incentives/possibilities, potentially providing incentives to both curb waste and 
 
 
1 This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of 





promote recycling. A UBP can be practically implemented by applying fees to use of waste 
bins, waste bags, or attached official tags/stickers. Units of waste can be measured by 
volume, weight, frequency, or some combination thereof. The pay-as-you-throw approach 
follows the ‘polluter pays’ principle, providing economic incentives to reduce waste.  It 
has been shown to be a potentially efficient approach to reduce the quantity of collected 
waste (Callan and Thomas 1999; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2009).  
Waste management is a critical issue in Taiwan because of its limited land and high 
population density. Taiwan is one of the most densely populated countries2 and has 
implemented a series of waste management policies to confront the disposal issue. Among 
those waste management policies, UBP policies and an MR policy have received 
considerable attention worldwide3. 
Taipei City (TPC), the capital of Taiwan, first implemented a UBP policy in July 
2000. New Taipei City4 (NTC), which surrounds Taipei City, introduced a pilot UBP 
program in July 2008, and a city-wide program in December 2010. Under that policy 
residents pay a waste-disposal fee based on the volume disposed. Residents must use 
 
 
2 The territorial area of Taiwan is 36,193 km2, and the total population is 23,519,518 in 2016. The 
population density is 649/ km2, which is second highest among the countries with at least 10,000,000 
people in the world. 
3 “Taiwan: The World’s Geniuses of Garbage Disposal.” The Wall Street Journal. May 17, 2016. Online. 
(Accessed December 12, 2017). “Taiwan’s Recycling Boom: A Shining Example for Asia, the World.” 
The Diplomat. December 3, 2013. Online. (Accessed December 12, 2017). “Short on Space, Taiwan 
Embraces a Boom in Recycling.” The New York Times. November 29, 2013. Online. (Accessed 
December 12, 2017). 
4 Despite similar names, Taipei City and New Taipei City are distinct cities, each with its own municipal 




authorized waste bags, which are sold in retail stores and priced by size. In New Taipei 
city, the price ranges from US $0.04 for the smallest bag to US $1.60 for the largest bag.  
Prices are almost identical in Taipei City and New Taipei City (see Panel A of Table II-
1). There are also neighboring municipalities and other major cities that do not have 
municipality-wide UBP policy: these include Keelung City, Yilan County, Taoyuan City, 
Taichung City, Tainan City, and Kaohsiung City.  
The presence of the UBP policy in Taipei City and New Taipei City coupled with 
nearby cities that do not have a UBP provides a natural experimental setting in which the 
effectiveness of UBP on waste related behavior can be studied relative to a behavior in a 
control group of municipalities without a UBP. The map in Figure II-1 shows the control 
group municipalities and their distances from the greater Taipei area. The spatial and 
intertemporal variation in UBP policies allows this study to estimate whether there are 
policy spillovers, where residents subject to UBP policies avoid fees either by shifting 
disposal to cities without such policies (i.e., a practice sometimes referred to as “waste 
tourism”) or by illegal dumping. Kinnaman (2006, 2008) argues the overall effect of UBP 
is ambiguous if there are unintended side effects (e.g. waste tourism or illegal dumping), 
and this ambiguity will be addressed herein. 
In addition to the UBP policy, Taiwan also implemented a nationwide MR policy in 
January of 2006. Under that policy, people who dispose of recyclable waste mixed with 
ordinary waste will be fined NT $1,200 – 6,000 (US $1 = NT $30), and waste-collection 
crews can refuse to collect mixed wastes. Details of the waste collection system in Taiwan 




Given this setting, the objectives of the work reported in this essay are: 
1)  to quantify the effect of UBP policy on the levels of unsorted waste, 
biodegradable waste5, and recyclable waste6. This is accomplished by 
using a difference-in-difference (DID) model between the cities with and 
without UBP policies. Besides that, this study also investigates whether 
illegal dumping and waste tourism are induced by the UBP policy; and  
2)  to study the influence of the nationwide MR policy. The essay examines 
the effects of implementing the MR policy in the level of waste, as well as 
its unintended side effects.  This is done by investigating changes in the 
quantity of different waste sources. The resultant findings can inform local 




5 Biodegradable waste includes waste food, nut or seafood shells, fruit peels, coffee grounds, waste plants, 
and other decomposable waste which can use for animal feed or composting. 
6 Recyclable waste also can be classified into ordinary recyclable waste and large recyclable waste. The 
former category includes paper, metal, plastic, glass, aluminum can, retort pouch, textile, appliance, 
battery, used light bulb, tire, electronics, and other recyclable items (e.g., umbrella, helmet, luggage). 






Figure II-1 Geographical illustration of Taiwan 
 
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the waste 
management literature and describes the waste management situation in Taiwan. Section 
3 describes the data used. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategies for estimating the 
effect of UBP policy and spillover effects. Section 5 presents estimates of static and 
dynamic policy effects of UBP and MR policies and their side effects. Finally, conclusions 
and policy implications are presented. 
II.2 Waste Management Literature Review 
II.2.1 Global Studies 
Several previous studies have investigated the effect of UBP policies. These studies 
were fundamentally based on two types of data: (i) household survey, and (ii) city-level 
aggregate data. Studies using household survey data are reviewed first. Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1996) estimate household responses to a UBP policy in Charlottesville, 




volume, but does not necessarily decrease the weight of household waste. Hong and 
Adams (1999) investigate the effects of a change in waste disposal service price on 
recycling in Portland, Oregon. They conclude that households respond to a price increase 
by increasing recycling to avoid extra charges for waste disposal. Hong (1999) 
investigates the effect of an increase in waste collection fees on recycling in South Korea 
and finds that households do not decrease waste collection volume after fees are increased, 
exhibiting relatively inelastic demand. Linderhof et al. (2001) find significant and sizeable 
price effects of weight-based pricing on compostable and non-recyclable waste for 
households in Oostzaan, the Netherlands. Jenkins et al. (2003) estimate the effect of 
curbside recycling, MR program, and unit pricing implemented using a survey results in 
20 U.S. metropolitan areas. They find that a curbside recycling program increases 
household recycling more than a unit pricing program with the effect varying across 
different recyclable materials. They also suggest that MR programs have an insignificant 
effect on recycling. 
Allers and Hoeben (2010) suggest that there are two disadvantages of using 
household-level survey data to evaluate UBP policies. First, such studies suffer from 
sample-selection bias because environmentally-conscious or well-educated people are 
more likely to respond, distorting results andmisleading policymakers. However, 
statistical corrections to such potential bias can overcome this criticism (Fullerton and 
Kinnaman 1996). Second, these survey studies typically focus on a short study period and 
may not capture the long-term policy impact. This also may be overcome, if time varying 




relative to aggregate data developing one’s own survey allows responses to waste related 
targeted questions to be integrated into the analysis. 
Studies have also used city-level aggregate data in evaluating UBP policy. Kinnaman 
and Fullerton (2000) use community-level cross-sectional data in evaluating waste fees 
and curbside recycling programs. They find that the effect of local waste management 
programs may be underestimated by assuming the policy is exogenous. Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus (2009; 2004)  examines effects of a UBP policy in the Netherlands, finding that it 
reduces the amount of unsorted waste, compostable waste, and increase recyclable waste. 
The authors also note that administrative costs are significantly lower for bag-based 
pricing. Usui and Takeuchi (2014) estimate a fixed effects model in Japan finding a long-
lasting effect of UBP on recycling and a differing effect by income group. Specifically the 
higher income groups are more likely to engage in recycling activities without economic 
incentives. Carattini, Baranzini, and Lalive (2018) use both administrative data and survey 
data to estimate the effect of a UBP policy in Switzerland and find that people accept 70% 
higher waste taxes after pricing waste by the bag compared to before the policy came into 
effect. 
Overall findings on the effectiveness of UBP policies are mixed, especially in terms 
of welfare impacts. Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) find a large welfare gain from the UBP 
policy that reduces waste in the Netherlands because of a higher marginal cost of waste 
collection and disposal. But Kinnaman (2006; 2008) asserts that the net benefits of 
introducing the UBP policy are small or even negative given the high administrative 




illegal dumping caused by the UBP policy, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) estimate the 
effect of UBP on illegal dumping by using indirect survey questions. Carattini, Baranzini, 
and Lalive (2018) evaluate illegal dumping by using the number of illegal dumping 
citations. Kim, Chang, and Kelleher (2008) estimate that a 1% increase in the unit price 
of a waste bag led to a 3% increase in the number of reports of illegal dumping in South 
Korea. Usui and Takeuchi (2014) find a small increase in disposal spillover to adjacent 
municipalities was identified when municipalities introduced their pricing schemes in 
Japan. Miranda and Aldy (1998) find that UBP do not increase illegal disposal of 
residential solid waste in U.S. communities. Given that estimated policy impacts vary in 
individual countries, more carefully done studies of differences in the impacts of country-
specific UBP policies are needed, to explore why they seem to work fairly well in some 
countries, but not others (e.g. the U.S.). 
II.2.2 Taiwanese Studies  
Several waste management related studies have been conducted in Taiwan. Lu (2006) 
overviews the waste management measures in Taiwan and highlights the importance of 
MR policy among other waste management measures in Taiwan. Yang and Innes (2007) 
investigate the impact of the Taipei City UBP policy using a fixed-effects pooled model 
and a seemingly unrelated regression, but the study does not estimate the side effects of 
the policy or the long-term policy effects. Yang and Innes (2007) also study a regional 
MR program (only in Kaohsiung City not nationwide one).  
In search of the literature, no previous study estimates the effects of the UBP policy 




quantify the effects of illegal dumping in terms of actual weight caused by relevant policy 
interventions. 
II.2.3 Background on Waste Management Systems in Taiwan 
The waste collected by municipalities in Taiwan contains four components: unsorted 
waste, biodegradable waste, recycled materials, and large recyclable waste. Large 
recyclable waste is primarily large-sized durable goods (e.g., sofas, mattresses, air 
conditioners, and refrigerators) that are not subject to the UBP policy. This study excludes 
large recyclable waste in this study.  
Municipal solid waste in Taiwan is typically collected by waste trucks five days a 
week. These trucks broadcast music to notify inhabitants of their arrival at a designated 
location. Usually, two different types of trucks arrive: an open-bed recycling truck and a 
waste truck. The recycling truck arrives 10 minutes before the waste truck, which collects 
unsorted and biodegradable waste. The recycling truck departs to the next pick-up area 
once the waste truck arrives. The system makes it difficult for households to avoid paying 
the disposal fee. Because residents have to personally deposit their waste in a waste truck 
that is monitored by the collection crew, it is relatively easy to inspect whether residents 
use officially-authorized waste bags or not. This collection system also allows collection 
crews to inform residents of the policy details and recycling options.  
In addition to the truck system, there are a few stationary waste collection locations in 
two cities.  These are also managed and monitored by collection crews and video cameras. 
Some apartments also have a centrally managed waste space that is also monitored by 




some residents sell their recyclable waste to private waste collection services. Although 
residents can earn money using these services, the private collector’s visits are irregular 
and are considered an inconvenience by residents. Also, the payments are relatively low, 
so the services are not widely used to dispose of recycling waste. 
The Taiwanese EPA also creates an incentive for residents to be involved in 
monitoring illegal dumping. Residents can upload video or photographic evidence to an 
online platform and earn up to half of the value of any fines collected. For instance, people 
disposing recyclable waste along with ordinary waste or not using government-issued 
waste bags will be fined NT $1,200 – 6,000 (US $1 = NT $30). Also, waste-collection 
crews can refuse to collect those wastes. 
Though all municipalities in Taiwan charge waste fees, only Taipei City and New 
Taipei City charge a variable fee by government-authorized waste bags. The other 
municipalities in Taiwan assess residents a flat waste fee that is included with water bills. 
These flat fees do not cause residents to face marginal fee changes and thus do not 
internalize external marginal collection and disposal costs. Some other major cities in 
Taiwan have expressed interest or implemented in a variable rate waste management 
policy. For example, Shigang Town, in Taichung City also has had UBP fees since 2000. 
However, Taichung City did not implement as it faced considerable opposition because of 
political considerations  and concerns over illegal dumping (Kinnaman 2006;2008). Note 
that although there is the small town in Taichung City implementing the UBP policy, this 
study do use Taichung City as one of control municipalities. Shigang Town is quite small 




Panel B of Table II-1). Because town-level data are not available, this study uses different 




Table II-1 Information of the UBP policy, Taichung City, and summary statistics. 
 





/ bag (kg) 
Bags / 
pack 
Taipei City  New Taipei City 
US$/pack US$/bag US$/L  US$/pack US$/bag US$/L 
3 0.6 20 0.70 0.04 0.01  0.80 0.04 0.01 
5 1 20 1.20 0.06 0.01  1.33 0.07 0.01 
14 2.9 20 3.33 0.17 0.01  3.73 0.19 0.01 
25 5.1 20 6.00 0.30 0.01  6.67 0.33 0.01 
33 6.9 20 7.90 0.40 0.01  8.80 0.44 0.01 
76 15.9 10 9.10 0.91 0.01  10.13 1.01 0.01 
120 25.1 5 7.20 1.44 0.01  8.00 1.60 0.01 
 
Panel B: Comparison between Taichung City and Shigang Town 
 
Area (km2) 
Population  Density (Pop./km2) 
2001 2016  2001 2016 
Taichung City 2,214.9 2,485,968 2,767,239  1,122.38 1,249.37 
Shigang Town 18.2 15,290 15,174  839.63 833.26 
Share of Taichung City 0.0082 0.0062 0.0055  - - 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Unsorted waste (kg per capita) 1,536 16.56 5.73 6.38 70.04 
Biodegradable waste (kg per capita) 1,152 2.62 1.23 0.02 5.98 
Recycling (kg per capita) 1,632 9.07 4.2 0.74 18.23 
Illegal dumping incident (count/1,000 ppl) 1,296 0.64 0.66 0.01 3.74 
Income (NTD 1,000) 1,632 1,163.46 207.05 874.4 1,697.89 
Percentage of babies 1,632 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.06 









This study uses both waste and municipal characteristics city wide data at a monthly 
frequency. The variables of interest are  
• quantity (by weight) of unsorted waste, biodegradable waste, and recycling from the 
Taiwanese Environmental Protection Administration (2018) from January 2001 to 
December 2016.  
o Unsorted waste is collected five days a week and is either sent to incineration 
plants or sent to landfills after being collected.  
o Biodegradable waste data are available from January 2003 to December 2014.  
o Illegal dumping data, which provide the number of illegal dumping violations, 
are collected by the major municipalities (Taipei City, New Taipei City, 
Taoyuan City, Taichung City, Tainan City, and Kaohsiung City) and are 
available from January 1998 to December 2015. These data are based on the 
number of citations to illegal waste dumpers which are assessed by inspection 
crews in Environmental Protection Bureaus of local governments or, as are 
reported by residents. 
• Municipal characteristic data include annual household income, monthly city 
population, percentage of babies (below 3-years-old), and the annual average 
household population. These data are available from January 1998 to December 2016.  
o Annual household income, available from the Statistical Bureau of Taiwan, 
consists of annual household salary, rents from other properties, and other 




o Monthly population data from the EPA records the monthly number of 
residents in each municipality.  
o Household characteristic data, including the population distribution by age, are 
provided by the Ministry of the Interior database.  
Summary statistics for the waste and municipal characteristic data are shown in Panel C 
of Table II-1. 
II.4 Estimation Strategies 
This study first uses a difference-in-difference model to estimate the effect of the 
UBP policy, using monthly-municipal data. New Taipei City is viewed as a treatment 
Municipality. Taipei City is included as a treated control, and six other municipalities in 
Taiwan without UBP policies are included as controls. The empirical approach of a static 
DID model is presented in detail in section 4.1, and a dynamic DID model is introduced 
in section 4.2.  
Spillover effects on neighboring municipalities without UBP policies are also 
investigated. In particular, this essay estimates whether municipalities adjacent to New 
Taipei City experienced an increase in waste disposal following the policy implementation 
using a regression discontinuity method. This spillover part of the empirical strategy is 





II.4.1 Difference-in-Difference Analysis of UBP 
This research estimates the average treatment effect (ATE) of a unit pricing policy on 
waste disposal using the following specification:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑤 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝐶 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑖 + 𝜏 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑡 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑖 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝜃 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑈𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 
+𝛾 ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑤  (1) 
where  
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑤 is the waste type w (i.e., quantity of unsorted waste, biodegradable waste, and 
recycling per person) in municipality i in period t. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of controls for municipality i at time t, such as the percentage of babies, 
household size, and income. 𝛼 is a vector of coefficient parameters for the 
set of controls for municipalities. 
𝑇𝑇𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals 1 following the implementation of the UBP 
policy, and equals 0 before the policy.  
𝑇𝐶𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation belongs to a treated 
municipality and equals 0 otherwise. Note since the unit price of the UBP 
policy is almost identical in the treated cities (Taipei City and New Taipei 
City) (refer to Panel A of Table II-1), using the dummy variable to estimate 
the effect of the UBP policy in both cities is not problematic. The 
coefficient of the intersection term between 𝑇𝑇𝑡 and 𝑇𝐶𝑖, 𝜏, accounts for 
the ATE of the UBP policy.  
𝑀𝑅𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an observation is after January 2006, 




Note that there is no control group to conduct a DID analysis for the 
national MR policy because the MR policy was implemented in all 
municipalities. Thus, the simple dummy variable is employed to analyze 
the MR policy in Equation (1). Its coefficient, 𝜌, captures the MR policy 
effect.  
𝑈𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the observation is in the period 
when the UBP policy is implemented in Taipei City or New Taipei City. 
The interaction term between 𝑀𝑅𝑡 and 𝑈𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝜃, captures differential 
effects of the MR policy on the non-UBP and UBP municipalities.  
 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a time trend which captures nationwide growth of environmental 
awareness and increasing familiarity with recycling behavior over the 
study period.  
𝜇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 represent municipality-specific fixed effects and monthly fixed effects, 
which respectively control for unobserved geographical and seasonal 
factors.  





II.4.2 Estimating Dynamic Effects of the UBP 
In addition to quantifying the intertemporal average effect of the UBP, the effect of 
the policy change over time is also relevant. To address this, this study constructs an 
alternative dynamic DID model (Equation 2): 
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑤 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1




+𝛿 ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑤   (2) 
where  
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑤 is the waste type w (i.e., quantity of unsorted waste, biodegradable waste, and 
recycling per person).  
𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes a matrix of characteristics of municipality i in time t, which is the same 
as defined in Equation (1).  
𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑘 denotes a set of indicator variables for 𝑘th lagged year after the 
implementation of the UBP policy. For instance, the UBP policy was first 
implemented in July 2008 in New Taipei City, so 𝐿𝑇𝑇1 is 1 if an 
observation is in the first year lag (i.e. 2009) and is zero otherwise. Other 
year lag length indicator variables use the same notation except for the 
indicator variable 2008 which is equal to 1 if an observation is in the period 
from July to December of 2008 and is zero otherwise.  
𝜏𝑘 is a treatment effect of the UBP policy in 𝑘th lagged year.  
𝜇𝑖 represents municipality-specific fixed effects. Note that the model cannot 




because of issues associated with multicollinearity. To estimate yearly 
dynamic treatment effects, the model needs to include yearly dummy 
variables instead of incorporating the MR policy dummy.  
𝜆𝑡 is a set of month and year dummies, which control unobserved seasonal effects 
and nationwide impacts of the MR policy over time. 
II.4.3 Potential Spatial Spillover Effects of UBP 
This section describes the identification strategy for spatial waste spillovers (or waste 
tourism) caused by the UBP policy. Given that waste disposal policies vary at the 
municipal level, it is possible for Taipei City and New Taipei City residents to avoid waste 
disposal fees by disposing of waste in nearby municipalities that do not have UBP. By 
moving waste from the treated to control municipalities, waste tourism would bias the 
estimated average treatment effect upward, making the policy appear effective even if the 
nationwide waste disposal levels were unchanged. 
To examine the waste spatial spillovers, the following municipality-specific time-
series model for municipality i is used: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑈𝐵𝑃𝑡 + 𝜌 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 +  𝜆𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                                (3) 
where  
𝑌𝑡 denotes the quantity of unsorted waste per person in time t.  
𝑋𝑡 denotes a matrix of characteristics of neighboring municipality in time t, such 




𝛾 is a coefficient on the policy spillover effects that is estimated using the policy 
dummy variables (𝑈𝐵𝑃𝑡), which have a value of 1 if observation is after 
July 2008, and 0 otherwise.  
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a linear time trend (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 that is used capture long-term time-variant 
unobservable trends, such as environmentally-conscious awareness and 
familiarity of recycling behavior, are controlled for using a in the model.  
𝜆𝑡 is a set of month dummies, which control unobserved seasonal effects.  
𝑒𝑡 denotes the error term.  
Results of Equations (3) are estimated using a generalized least squares approach to 
make the results robust to serial correlation. 
II.5 Empirical Results 
II.5.1 Results on implementing UBP  
The quantities of unsorted waste, biodegradable waste, recycling, and illegal 
dumping are plotted over time for each city in the sample in Figure II-2, respectively. The 
first vertical dashed line in July 2000 marks the implementation of the UBP policy in 
Taipei City. The vertical dashed line in January 2006 and in July 2008 indicate the 
implementation of the nationwide MR policy and the beginning of the UBP pilot program 
in New Taipei City, respectively. The dashed line in December 2010 marks when the 
policy was expanded to cover the entire New Taipei City. Note that this study excludes 
observations for unsorted waste in September 2001 because there is an extremely high 
amount of unsorted waste in that period in Taipei City. This outlier was caused by 




in residential and commercial areas. In fact, the UBP policy was temporarily suspended 
during a one-month cleanup period.  
Overall, Figure II-2 displays parallel trends for these variables of interest in the 
sample municipalities during the pre-treatment periods. Unsorted waste had a downward 
trend over the study period. Biodegradable and recyclable waste had an increasing trend 
(see Panel B and C of Figure II-2). The number of illegal dumping incidences in New 
Taipei City increased sharply right after the UBP policy extended to the entire city, but it 
fell a few years after implementation of the policy.  
 
Figure II-2 Trend for variables of interest 
Note: The vertical line in July of 2000 indicates the implementation of the UBP policy in TPC; 
the vertical line in January of 2006 indicates the implementation of the nationwide MR policy; the 




vertical line in December of 2010 indicates the implementation of the city-wide UBP policy in 
NTC. 
 
Table II-2 presents the results of the basic DID model with and without including 
observations in Taichung City, using only observations on or after January 2006 after the 
MR policy was implemented nationwide. Although the UBP policy in Taiwan is volume-
based, waste data are measured by weight, as opposed to volume. This is important for the 
following reasons. First, the volume of waste can vary based on household behavior 
because waste can be compacted, even if by hand. This potentially introduces endogeneity 
in volume. The weight of the waste does not depend on a change in volume. Second, the 
original units of the data are weights of the waste per month so that the data do not need 
to do any conversion. Third, most relevant studies also estimate policy effects by weight 
of the wastes, facilitating comparisons. Finally, the study can gauge possible illegal 
dumping by weight (refer to Section 6.2 for details) which is more precise compared to 
the number of illegal dumping citations. 
This study estimates that the UBP policy in New Taipei City on average reduced the 
quantity of unsorted waste by 2.59 kg per capita per month, or a 14% decline. The 
combination of the UBP policy and MR policy caused a 3.48 kg per capita per month 
reduction in unsorted waste, or an 18% decline relative to New Taipei City’s 2007 level. 
The MR policy alone had no statistically significant effect on reducing unsorted waste.  
Furthermore, the MR policy had a more significant effect on increasing biodegradable 
waste in New Taipei City compared to the UBP policy. Biodegradable waste disposal 
increased by 0.62 kg per capita per month (a 34% increase relative to New Taipei City’s 




kg per capita per month (a 59% increase relative to Taipei City’s 2000 level), but the UBP 
policy alone in New Taipei City did not significantly increase recycling. The interaction 
term between the UBP and MR policy in the model, implying the combination effect of 
both policies, accounts for an additional increase of 0.99 kg per capita per month (a 14% 
increase relative to New Taipei City’s 2007 level). The MR policy alone also helped to 
stimulate recycling by 1.6 kg per capita per month (a 31% increase relative to New Taipei 
City’s 2005 level). The results also show that the UBP policy in New Taipei City increased 
illegal dumping by 0.27 violation incidences per 1,000 people relative to the control cities 
However, there is no statistical evidence showing that the MR policy increased illegal 
dumping. 
There is a potential confounding issue caused by the pilot UBP program in Shigang 
Town of Taichung City, and to address this, the study estimates the policy effects on four 
variables of interest with all data and again by excluding data in Taichung City. Due to 
the small scale of the town in terms of sizes and populations compared to entire Taichung 
City, the town barely affected the level of waste in Taichung City. The estimation yields 







Table II-2 Estimated effects of the UBP and MR policy on waste. 
 Unsorted  Biodegradable 
All data Exclude TCC Post Jan-2006  All data Exclude TCC Post Jan-2006 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Percentage of babies 179.00** 183.74 -78.13  -54.07** -44.56** -69.45** 
 (90.80) (132.89) (102.56)  (22.14) (20.79) (31.29) 
Household size -5.48 -8.27 -5.72*  -8.5 -7.94* 0.23 
 (8.22) (10.21) (2.98)  (6.01) (4.22) (0.76) 
Income (NTD 1,000) 0.01 0.01 0.01**  0.0003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
I(UBP in NTC) -2.59*** -2.81*** -4.58***  0.18 0.38* 0.88*** 
 (0.31) (0.23) (0.59)  (0.34) (0.22) (0.11) 
MR -1.15 -1.4   0.62** 0.79***  
 (1.00) (1.20)   (0.27) (0.25)  
I(UBP in NTC) × MR -3.48** -2.59**   0.69 0.3  
 (1.36) (1.15)   (0.50) (0.24)  
Time trend -0.08** -0.09** -0.07***  -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 27.4 35.77 32.48***  27.28 23.30* 2.49** 
 (20.48) (22.74) (3.67)  (17.83) (12.67) (1.23) 
Duration Jan 2001 – 
 Dec 2016 
Jan 2001 –  
Dec 2016 
Jan 2006 –  
Dec 2016 
 Jan 2003 –  
Dec 2014 
Jan 1998 – 
 Dec 2014 
Jan 2006 –  
Dec 2014 
Num. of municipalities 8 7 8  8 7 8 
Observations 1,536 1,344 1,056  1,152 1,008 864 
Municipal fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Monthly fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The unit of income is NT$ thousands (US$ 1 = NT$ 30). The treatment effects of UBP and MR 
policies are in terms of kg per capita. All standard errors are clustered by cities. The results of municipal and monthly fixed effects are 





Table II-2 Estimated effects of the UBP and MR policy on waste (cont.).  
 Recycling  Illegal dumping incident 
All data Exclude TCC Post Jan-2006  All data Exclude TCC Post Jan-2006 
(7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
Percentage of babies -169.36*** -214.09*** -51.94  11.16 1.80  -18.26*** 
 (47.61) (38.92) (64.64)  (19.43) (23.13) (7.01) 
Household size 1.4 5.94 -6.35***  -1.87 -0.6 -1.48*** 
 (5.64) (4.43) (1.66)  (2.87) (3.79) (0.11) 
Income (NTD 1,000) 0.002 0.002 0.001  -0.0003 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
I(UBP in TPC) 2.60*** 2.33***   0.35 0.27  
 (0.39) (0.39)   (0.27) (0.34)  
I(UBP in NTC) -0.67* -0.37 0.67*  0.27* 0.29 0.23 
 (0.37) (0.29) (0.36)  (0.14) (0.20) (0.17) 
MR 1.60*** 1.79***   0.02 -0.001  
 (0.54) (0.53)   (0.07) (0.07)  
I(UBP in NTC) × I(UBP in TPC) × MR 0.99* 0.52   0.002 -0.1  
 (0.52) (0.40)   (0.25) (0.33)  
Time trend 0.04** 0.05*** 0.01  -0.004 0.0002 0.002 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 5.69 -6.2 27.63***  6.40 3.54 7.77*** 
 (15.15) (12.11) (3.01)  9.55 (12.39) (2.48) 
Duration Jan 2000 –  
Dec 2016 
Jan 2000 –  
Dec 2016 
Jan 2006 –  
Dec 2016 
 Jan 1998 -  
Dec 2015 
Jan 1998 –  
Dec 2015 
Jan 2006 –  
Dec 2015 
Num. of municipalities 8 7 8  6 5 6 
Observations 1,632 1,428 1,056  1,296 1,080 720 
Municipal fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Monthly fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The unit of income is NT$ thousands (US$ 1 = NT$ 30). The treatment effects of UBP and MR 
policies are in terms of kg per capita. All standard errors are clustered by cities. The results of municipal and monthly fixed effects are 




The identification assumption of DID in this study is based on the fact that in the 
absence of the UBP policy, municipalities’ waste level in the treated municipalities would 
have remained similar to the municipalities yet to be treated. This is known as a common 
trend assumption. To check the robustness of the estimated average treatment effect, a 
falsification or Placebo test, which evaluates the common trend identification assumption 
required in DID models, was conducted. The aim of these robustness checks is to 
demonstrate that the estimated treatment effect in Table II-2 is not simply the result of 
chance. Rather, the estimation is statistically different from counterfactual treatment 
effects which are estimated by creating artificial counterfactual policy interventions.  
First, monthly counterfactual policy intervention dummies were created using data in 
the pre-treatment period. These policy dummies are equal to 1 from the time of 
counterfactual policy interventions through the end of the pre-treatment period and have 
zero values before the counterfactual policy interventions. Using the counterfactual policy 
dummies in Equation (1), rather than the actual policy dummy, the new model can be 
written as 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝐶 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑖 + 𝜏𝐶 ∙ 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑡 ∙ 𝑇𝐶𝑖 
+𝜌 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡        (4) 
where 𝐴𝑇𝑈 is the average treatment effect on the untreated, namely a counterfactual 
treatment time dummy indicating counterfactual policy interventions in each month during 
the pre-treatment period. The coefficient on the interaction term is the counterfactual 





Iteratively replacing 𝐴𝑇𝑈 in Equation (4) with different counterfactual policy 
interventions yields different counterfactual treatment effects (𝜏𝐶). The distribution of 
those counterfactual treatment effects using the same model specifications with Models 
(1), (4), (7), and (10) of Table II-2 is shown in Figure II-3, and its statistical summary is 
presented in Panel A of Table II-3. The result of the Placebo test shows that the true ATEs 
are significantly different with the counterfactual placebo treatment effects (𝜏𝐶) for 
unsorted waste, biodegradable waste, and illegal dumping incidences, but the estimation 
in recycling appears to be less robust. In other words, except for the estimated effect in 
recycling, the treatment effect estimated by the DID model is larger than would be 
expected by chance, indicating that the estimated ATEs of Table II-2 capture the actual 
policy impact. 
In addition to the Placebo test, this essay constructs a t-test to examine whether the 
quantity of unsorted waste, biodegradable waste, recycling, and illegal dumping have 
common trends for the treatment and control municipalities in the pre-treatment period. 
The growth rate is calculated by (𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑡) 𝑌𝑡⁄ , where 𝑌𝑡 is the quantity of unsorted, 
biodegradable waste, recycling, or illegal dumping in month 𝑡. The p-values of the t-tests 
are presented in Panel B of Table II-3. The null hypotheses, which assumes the average 
growth rates in the treated and control municipalities are identical in the pre-treatment 
period, cannot be rejected in a 90% confidence level. That is, the identifying assumption 





Figure II-3 Placebo test for the difference-in-differences model.  
Note: The vertical dashed lines in the graphs indicate the average treatment effect on the untreated 







Table II-3 Robustness check for the difference-in-differences model. 
Panel A: Statistic summary of counterfactual treatment effect 
 Unsorted waste Biodegradable waste Recycling Illegal dumping 
Mean -0.783 -0.118 -0.689 -0.1078 
95% CI (-0.9500, -0.6157) (-0.15056, -0.0855) (-0.7651, -0.6128) (-0.1154, -0.1002) 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.7075 0.000 
Actual ATE of UBP  -2.5900 0.1779 -0.6745 0.2689 
 





Recycling Illegal dumping 
NTC=TPC 0.337 0.936 0.769 0.9878 
NTC=KLC 0.425 0.666 0.398 - 
NTC=YLC 0.536 0.623 0.695 - 
NTC=TYC 0.572 0.125 0.731 0.8473 
NTC=TCC 0.496 0.101 0.152 0.9244 
NTC=TNC 0.516 0.525 0.602 0.9836 
NTC=KSC 0.451 0.918 0.560 0.8977 
Note: NTC represents as New Taipei City; KLC represents as Keelung City; YLC represents Yilan 
County; TYC represents Taoyuan City; TCC represents Taichung City; TNC represents Tainan 
City; KSC represents Kaohsiung City. Panel A shows the distribution of counterfactual treatment 
effects (𝜏𝐶) using the same model specification with Model (1), (4), (7), and (10) of Table II-2. 




II.5.2 Dynamic Effects of UBP 
The dynamic treatment effects of the UBP policy in New Taipei City are reported in 
Figure II-4. The UBP policy effect on unsorted waste began with an insignificantly small 
reduction during the pilot program (i.e. 2008-2010, or lagging years 0-2), and the effect 
size increased and remained significant after the policy went into effect for all of New 
Taipei City (i.e. 2011-2016 or lagging years 3-8). On the other hand, the effect of UBP on 
biodegradable waste was not measurable during the pilot program, but a significantly 
positive effect is estimated at the beginning of the city-wide policy rollout (i.e. 2011-2012 
or 3rd - 4th  lagged year) and slightly diminishes as time passes. Unlike the significant 
results for unsorted and biodegradable waste, the UBP policy had an unclear effect on 
recycling in New Taipei City but had significant effects on increasing recycling in Taipei 
City. This result suggests that the growth in recycling in New Taipei City shown in Figure 
II-2 could be mainly explained by the MR policy, which is consistent with the estimated 
result for recycling in Table II-2. 
Illegal dumping also changes over time. The dynamic DID model for illegal dumping 
shows that the incremental amount of illegal dumping in New Taipei City spiked after the 
UBP policy was introduced and diminished with the passage of time. Also note that the 
increase in illegal dumping was not evident during the pilot program (i.e. 2008-2010, or 
with years lagged at 0-2) and only became evident after the full implementation of the 
UBP policy (i.e. 2012 and 2014, or lagged years 4 and 6). However, the UBP policy in 






Figure II-4 Dynamic average treatment effects (ATE)  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Gray shades indicate a 95% confidence interval. All 





II.5.3 Analysis of Spatial Spillover Effects of UBP 
The examination of potential spatial waste spillovers using the municipality-specific 
time-series model in Section 4.3 is presented in Table II-4. The insignificant coefficients 
of the UBP policy in New Taipei City suggest that there are no waste spillovers from New 
Taipei City to neighboring municipalities except for Yilan County. The marginally 
significant coefficient indicates that the UBP of New Taipei City may marginally increase 
unsorted waste in Yilan County, implying that there may be spatial waste spillover from 
New Taipei City to Yilan County. Besides that, the MR policy increased the amount of 
unsorted waste in Yilan County. Note that Yilan County is a rural area where the 
enforcement of inspecting non-recycling behaviors may not be as strict as urban areas are. 
The population density of Yilan county is much lower than in other urban municipalities, 
so it would be more difficult to observe neighbors’ non-recycling behaviors.  
Taken together, the results in Table II-4 suggests that the implementation of the UBP 
policy in New Taipei City did not induce waste tourism in its adjacent urban municipalities 





Table II-4 Examination of spatial waste spillovers from New Taipei City to 
neighbor municipalities. 
 Unsorted waste (kg per capita) 
Taipei City Taoyuan City Keelung City Yilan County 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (NTD 1,000) 0.017 0.004 0.003 -0.006** 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Percentage of babies 51.470 781.951*** 468.891*** 966.927*** 
 (83.636) (118.284) (157.717) (176.111) 
Household size 42.210** -43.733** -38.316 -0.848 
 (19.764) (19.332) (25.507) (24.180) 
I(UBP in NTC) 0.647 -0.625 -2.107*** 1.214* 
 (0.838) (0.815) (0.753) (0.682) 
MR -0.634 -0.362 -2.131** 2.074** 
 (0.941) (0.755) (0.968) (0.815) 
Time trend -0.022 -0.143*** -0.092 0.007 
 (0.039) (0.054) (0.062) (0.083) 
Constant -130.513** 115.172** 105.927* -13.055 
 (59.828) (57.766) (61.402) (70.265) 
Observations 190 190 190 190 
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -343.210 -346.390 -350.374 -289.835 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 726.420 732.780 740.747 619.669 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 789.370 795.730 803.697 682.619 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The unit of income is NT$ thousands (US$ 1 = NT$ 30). The 
treatment effects of UBP and MR policies are in terms of kg per capita. All standard errors are 






II.6.1 Comparison Between the UBP Policy and the MR Policy 
Which waste management instrument is more effective between the UBP and MR 
policy? To answer this question, this study first compare which policy instrument is more 
effective to achieve the basic policy goal of more greatly reducing unsorted waste, 
increasing biodegradable waste and recycling. The comparison is based on the estimates 
from the DID models presented in Section 5.  
The results of the DID model in Table II-2 demonstrate that the UBP policy alone 
significantly reduced the quantity of unsorted waste in New Taipei City by 2.59 kg per 
capita/month, the combination of the UBP and MR policy decreased in unsorted waste by 
3.48 kg per capita/month, and increased recycling by 0.99 kg per capita/month. Model 7 
of Table II-2 shows that the UBP policy did not increase recycling in New Taipei City but 
did in Taipei City. A possible reason is that Taipei City implemented the UBP policy 
earlier than the MR policy and had a relatively lower benchmark level of recycling, so the 
UBP policy in Taipei City had much more room to stimulate recycling. The growth of 
recycling in New Taipei City was affected more by the MR policy than the UBP policy 
because the latter was implemented later in the period. On the other hand, the MR policy 
did not lead to reducing unsorted waste but inducing an increase in the quantity of 
biodegradable waste and recycling by 0.62 and 1.6 kg per capita/month, respectively. 
Importantly, the MR policy did not cause illegal dumping. However, the UBP policy in 
New Taipei City increased illegal dumping (Panel E of Figure II-4) but did not 




there is no waste tourism caused by both UBP and MR policy in neighbor urban 
municipalities but likely in adjacent rural municipalities (Table II-4). 
Overall, according to the estimation results in Section 5, the UBP policy in New Taipei 
City was more effective than the MR policy in curbing unsorted waste but could also lead 
to increasing illegal dumping. On the other hand, the MR policy leads to increased 
biodegradable waste and recycling without causing illegal dumping. With these tradeoffs 
the optimal policy thus depends on policymaker’s specific goals, as well as their available 
waste management resources. The cities need to have corresponding administrative 
resources ready to prevent the illegal dumping (Ichinose and Yamamoto 2011). 
II.6.2 Quantifying Illegal Dumping 
Given the identification strategy and data, this study can assess the effect of the UBP 
policy on illegal dumping citations and a frequency range of weights based on the results 
of the DID model in Table II-2. 
To estimate UBP effects on the approximate weight of illegal dumping caused by the 
UBP policy alone, this study uses the estimated results with the post-2006 model of Table 
II-2. The post-2006 model shows that the UBP policy significantly reduced the quantity 
of unsorted waste in New Taipei City by 4.58 kg per capita/month while it increased the 
quantity of biodegradable waste and recycling by 0.88 and 0.67 kg per capita/month. Part 
of the 4.58 kg reduction per capita/month of unsorted waste can be accounted for by an 
increase of 1.55 kg per capita/month in biodegradable and recyclable waste that would 
have otherwise been included in unsorted waste. After accounting for this, noting that 




(Table II-4), this leads to an estimated net unsorted waste reduction of 3.03 kg per 
person/month. This missing unsorted waste could be explained by illegal dumping, 
lifestyle changes, or other unobserved factors which can reduce residents’ waste disposal 
and were not controlled for by time trend, time and municipal fixed effects. If all of the 
missing waste is considered to be illegal dumping, then the amount is 3.03 kg per 
capita/month or 143,160 tons per year (31% of average annual total collected waste from 
2009 to 2016). One can scale this back by making assumptions on the proportion of 
missing waste that is illegal dumping. A detailed range analysis on illegal dumping is 
shown in the upper part of Table II-5.  
II.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The analysis reported on in this essay demonstrates that the UBP policy reduced the 
quantity of unsorted waste in all periods in the cities where it was applied. It also caused 
an increase in recycling in Taipei City as the policy was implemented in the period before 
the mandatory recycling was implemented, but not in New Taipei City as implementation 
did not occur until after the mandatory recycling policy was in place.  The study also finds 
that there is no illegal out of city waste dumping caused by New Taipei City’s UBP. We 
also found a mild increase in unsorted waste in an adjacent rural municipality after UBP 
implementation (Model 4 of Table II-4). Finally, the essay finds a short-term increase in 
illegal dumping that diminished in the long term. In contrast, the MR policy boosted 
biodegradable waste and recycling without detecting illegal dumping.  
The implications of the study results are as follows. First, the implementation of the 




dumping volume dropped over time. This result implies that the implementation of the 
UBP policy can cause unintentional environmental damage and additional administration 
costs to monitor illegal dumping and waste tourism that may diminish over time. Second, 
the UBP policy could reduce waste without inducing illegal dumping if there is a proper 
provision of waste management resources (Ichinose and Yamamoto 2011). This argument 
is supported by the estimation of the UBP policy in Taipei City, where the resulting finding 
shows that the UBP policy increases recycling volumes without increasing illegal 
dumping (see Table II-2, Panel D and F of Figure II-4). This result also supports work by 
Yang and Innes (2007), who found that illegal dumping is not a serious problem in Taipei 
City perhaps due to its larger level of funding for environmental affairs in the city budget. 
Third, the MR policy effectively increased the sorting out of biodegradable waste and the 
amount of recycling. Nevertheless, implementing the MR policy alone may not 
necessarily reduce unsorted waste since there is no monetary incentive for residents to do 
so. A combination of implementing the UBP and MR policy would be a favorable way to 
curb unsorted waste and to encourage sorting and recycling behaviors.  
This study may shed some light on differences in estimated impacts of UBP programs 
in the literature. In this study, the UBP policy effects differed between Taipei and New 
Taipei cities and thus can be specific to the locale in case of Taiwan due to implementation 
timing and interaction with other waste policies (in this case the MR policy). This may 
help explain mixed conclusions in the literature about UBP policy effectiveness.  
Furthermore, many of the U.S. studies (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995; 1996; Kinnaman 




studies conducted in European settings (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2004; 2009; Allers and 
Hoeben 2010; Carattini, Baranzini, and Lalive 2018; Sterner and Bartelings 1999), provide 
a relatively optimistic aspect of UBP policies with lower illicit dumping conditional on 
enforcement. This study shows that there were some unintended effects of illegal dumping 
following by the implementation of the UBP policy in the short-run. However, the benefits 
of the UBP occurred in both short-run and long-run. Namely, this essay not only verifies 
the concern from U.S. studies but also finds appreciable benefits of the UBP policy as 
many European country studies find. This Taiwan based study suggests that the negative 
side effects appear to diminish as time passes, but the benefits brought by the UBP policy 
remain in the long-run. For Taiwan, a well-design mechanism and program to prevent an 
occurrence of side effects, the idea of ‘polluter pays’ is a plausible policy instrument to 
reflect the true social cost of managing waste. 
The study has limitations and suggests some future research needs. First, policymakers 
may well be interested in learning how to design a UBP policy which can reduce the 
possibility of causing unintentional effects with a relatively low policy implementation 
cost. For instance, it would be useful to have research address how the UBP fee structure 
affects the magnitude of unintentional policy effects (e.g. illegal dumping and waste 
tourism). In addition, since an implementation of UBP can induce waste reduction, 
research could address the implications of UBP for needed solid waste combustion and 




CHAPTER III  
CAN HONEY INFORMATION AFFECT CONSUMER BEHAVIOR IN AN 
EXPERIMENTAL SETTING? IMPLICATIONS OF ADULTERATION, ORIGIN, 
AND REVIEW INFORMATION 
III.1 Introduction 
Honey is a product with labeling that contains ambiguous product related 
information. For example, the labels include terms such as “pure,” “raw,” or “natural” 
honey but there are no uniform standards on the honey product characteristics that merit 
such terms. In 1985, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) amended the voluntary 
Honey Grading System, classifying honey products into grades (A, B, and C) based on 
moisture content, absence of defects, flavor, aroma, clarity, and color (USDA 1985). 
However, with the grading System being voluntary, it is not enforced relative to labeling. 
Furthermore, not all consumers are informed on the grading system and what the grades 
mean to them. 
Another challenge facing honey consumers is honey adulteration. The most common 
adulteration practice involves dilution with water or cheap sweeteners while still claiming 
that the product is pure, raw, or natural honey (Soares et al. 2017). Honey adulteration 
also increases food safety concerns, especially for adulterated honey from Asian countries 
(Olmsted 2016; The Economist 2018; Melnick 2011). In fact, honey has been reported as 
one of the most adulterated food products in terms of global value of adulterated  products 
(Olmsted 2016; The Economist 2018).  To avoid food safety issues associated with 




2015; Cosmina et al. 2016). Local honey is also desirable because of the environmental 
benefits of pollination services provided by local honey bee colonies (Wu et al. 2015). 
However, due to honeybee movement it is challenging to identify and accurately certify a 
honey product’s geographic and botanical origin.  
Nevertheless, informing consumers better on product quality and origin may provide 
consumers with desirable information and may induce consumers to be willing to pay a 
higher price.  To address this possibility, research on product information and labeling 
was conducted in an experimental setting. Specifically, with assistance from a team of 
apiculture experts at Texas A&M University this research examined the possible 
introduction of a certified local Texas honey seal (hereafter abbreviated as the “Real Texas 
Honey seal”). The research was done as part of a project carried out with the Texas 
Department of Agriculture, the Texas Beekeepers Association.  
Specifically, to explore willingness-to-pay (WTP) responses to sources of honey 
choice information, this essay aims to investigate how consumers react to various types of 
information when making choices. The study investigates consumer honey choice 
preferences based on the presence or absence of information on adulteration, and location 
of production information (certified Real Texas Honey seal), and customer responses to 
product reviews. The investigation was done in an experimental, eye-tracking laboratory 
setting utilizing information presented on a computer screen.  
This research explores the following questions:  





(2)  Do product reviews affect consumers’ WTP for honey products? Are these 
effects symmetrical between positive and negative reviews? 
(3)  Does the presence of a Real Texas Honey seal increase consumers’ WTP of 
certified Texas honey? 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of past 
honey studies and relevant eye-tracking experimental studies. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design and data collection process. Section 4 explains the empirical 
methodology used to analyze the data collected from the experiment. Section 5 shows the 
experimental results. Lastly, the conclusions and the corresponding policy implications 
are presented in Section 6. 
III.2 Literature Review 
III.2.1 Overview of Consumer Demand for Honey Products 
Numerous studies have investigated consumer preferences for honey products. 
Unnevehr and Gouzou (1998) use U.S. retail scanner data to examine the association 
between price premium for honey and characteristics showing the highest premiums are 
associated with unique monofloral sources with a distinctive flavor, such as acacia, alfalfa, 
and apple. Ghorbani and Khajehroshanaee (2009) apply a hedonic model to study price 
effects of honey characteristics using Iranian data from a cross-sectional honey purchasing 
database covering 360 consumers. They find that factors such as packing characteristics, 
dark color of honey, and scented honey have a positive effect on honey prices.  
In addition, survey and questionnaire data has been used in honey preference studies. 




attributes, followed by packaging, small-scale of production, and color. Gámbaro et al. 
(2007) study color effects across 30 honey sample finding that Uruguayan consumers 
dislike light-color honey. Yeow et al. (2014) find that health condition of respondents, 
product quality, brand reputation, and pricing influence purchasing intentions. Jensen and 
Mørkbak (2013) find that gastronomic attributes (terroir, freshness, appearance), 
externality attributes (local environment, creation of local jobs, reduced food miles i.e. the 
distance food is transported), price and availability are key factors in consumer decisions 
in Denmark. Brščić, Šugar, and Poljuha (2017) find that designation of point of origin is 
desirable, and buying domestic honey origin is viewed as a way of contributing to 
domestic economy development. 
Comparing to grading systems and local food labels, word of mouth seems to be a 
more appealing and accessible way to some consumers for making honey choices 
nowadays. An increasing number of consumers share their product experiences online, 
and more and more people rely on those online information to make their purchase 
decisions  (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels 2013; Fradkin, 
Grewal, and Holtz 2018). A specific example is that product reviews disclosing customer 
experiences have been shown to have an impact on purchasing decisions (Mudambi and 
Schuff 2010; Weathers, Swain, and Grover 2015). 
Despite all the aforementioned findings, only a few studies have taken a direct 
experimental approach to test consumer preferences for honey products. Wu et al. (2015) 
conduct an auction experiment to evaluate consumer behavior related to the location of 




varies significantly with these features. Cosmina et al. (2016) perform a choice experiment 
and find a higher WTP for honey produced from the respondents’ country of origin and 
from organic beekeeping. 
III.2.2 Eye-tracking and Consumer Behavior Studies  
Eye-tracking technology has been widely applied in consumer behavior and choice 
experiments (as reviewed in Van Loo, Grebitus, et al. 2018).  Eye-tracking devices can 
provide visual metrics on areas of interest (AOI) including time to first fixation (ms), first 
fixation duration (ms), fixation time spent (ms or percentage of total time spent), fixations 
count, and revisits count. One challenge in using eye-tracking devices is how to link visual 
attention measurements with economic decision making. Using visual metrics captured by 
eye-tracking devices alone cannot provide meaningful economic implications. 
Consequently, to provide economic intuition to explain subjects’ behavior, economically 
based eye-tracking studies endeavor to link their results with economic factors (Samant 
and Seo 2016; Van Loo et al. 2015). Adding interaction terms between product attributes 
including prices and visual metrics using an econometric model has been used to explain 
the relationship between visual attention and consumer choice outcomes (Van Loo et al. 
2015; Rihn et al. 2016). This approach, however, raises potential endogeneity concerns 
because unobserved subjects’ background factors are possibly correlated to those visual 
metrics (Takahashi, Todo, and Funaki 2018). Alternatively, grouping subjects by visual 
focus on distinct areas of interest then investigating choices in those groups allows 
researchers to investigate effects of visual characteristics on choice decisions (Behe et al. 




A few eye-tracking studies have been conducted with agricultural commodities. Behe 
et al. (2014) studied consumer preferences for commodity attributes and their association 
with visual searching behavior. Their results show that subjects, who were classified into 
cohorts based on their preferences on specific production methods, spent more time 
looking at labeling information that was related to production methods. Their results also 
suggested that retailers should carefully consider the impacts of retail signs on different 
groups of consumers. Van Loo et al.( 2015) utilize eye-tracking measures to identify the 
relationship between U.S. consumer visual attention and  preferences for coffee products’ 
sustainability attributes (carbon footprint, organic labeling, or belonging to the Rainforest 
Alliance). Their results show that consumers who pay more visual attention to 
sustainability attributes have a stronger preference and a higher WTP for coffee products 
with desirable sustainability attributes. Rihn et al. (2016) investigate the relation between 
purchasing likelihood (PL) and visual search behavior for ornamental plants, finding that 
organic production methods and domestic origin positively influenced PL.  
Thus far, no studies have applied eye-tracking devices to investigate honey product 
choices with adulteration characteristic and product review information. Here this study 
uses eye-tracking technology to provide insights into how consumers respond to complex 
information in grocery decision-making processes.  
III.3 Experimental Design and Data Collection 
III.3.1 Experiment Procedure 
This study employs an eye-tracking choice experiment and a post-experiment survey. 




and were randomly assigned to a control or a treatment group. At the beginning of the 
experiments, subjects in the treatment group were asked to read an article about honey 
adulteration fact that arose from the Netflix documentary: “Rotten” (Figure III-1). In 
contrast, those in the control group did not read the article. After this, subjects were 
directed to the eye-tracking stations and were led through eye-tracking device calibration 
using a Tobii Pro Spectrum (300 Hz, accuracy 0.3⁰, precision 0.06⁰ RMS) device.  
 
Figure III-1 Treatment article 
 
After calibration, subjects began an eye-tracking choice experiment, which was a 
hypothetical choice experiment covering twelve choice tasks. Each choice task involved 
two alternatives plus one no-purchase option (Figure III-1). Subjects were asked to choose 
the most preferable option among those three options. The attributes presented were 
selected based on previous interviews with local honey producers.  They were price, 
origin, whether the honey was “organic,” “natural,” or “pure,” product reviews, and 
container types. The price attribute was defined in three levels: $6, $9, and $12 per honey 




origin attribute included information on whether the honey in origin was imported, U.S., 
or Texas honey. The organic, natural, and pure attribute claims were displayed as either 
“yes” or “no” options. The product review attribute was either “positive” review, 
“negative” review, or case where no review was available. The positive and negative 
reviews used were real honey product reviews taken and revised from Amazon (refer to 
Table A1 of the Appendix for more details). The container type was either a bottle in the 
shape of a bear, a standard glass jar, or a plastic jar.  
To investigate the effect of the Real Texas Honey seal on the subjects’ WTP, whenever 
an alternative included a Texas origin, the Real Texas Honey seal was displayed next to 
the container. Additionally, there is no certified organic honey produced in Texas. Thus, 
this study added a restriction to the design. If an alternative was that the honey had a Texas 
origin, it could not be organic honey. All product attributes and their corresponding levels 
are shown in Table III-1 and Figure III-2. The experimental design of twelve choice sets 
was generated in Ngene using D-optimal design matrices, and the resulting D-error was 
1.95.  
After the eye-tracking choice experiment was completed, subjects’ choice decisions 
were recorded and were directed to complete a post-experiment survey that asked subjects’ 
socio-economic backgrounds, knowledge about honey, and attitudes toward the 
environment (refer to Table A2 of the Appendix for details). Upon completion of the 





Table III-1 Attributes in the choice experiment 
Attributes Levels 
Price $6 $9 $12 (3 levels) 
Origin Imported (base) Texas  U.S. (3 levels) 
Organic No Yes  (2 levels) 
Natural No Yes  (2 levels) 
Pure No Yes  (2 levels) 
Review No review (base) Positive review Negative review (3 levels) 
Container Plastic (base) Glass Bear shape (3 levels) 
 
 







III.3.2 Recruitment Process 
The recruitment process used local newspaper ads and a bulk email associated with an 
existing grocery shopper database in Bryan and College Station, Texas, which include 
both the general population and student subjects. To minimize possible inaccuracy of eye-
tracking devices, the recruitment information indicated that participants must not have had 
eye corrective surgery and cannot wear glasses (contact lenses were acceptable). 
Participants were informed that they would receive a compensation fee of $30 for 
participation once they finish all the required tasks. 
A total of 177 subjects participated in July and August 2018. Eye-tracking calibration 
failed for four subjects. Thus, valid responses of 173 subjects were compiled: 87 in the 
control group and 86 in the treatment group. The sample characteristics and the balance 
test are shown in Table III-2. Most of the variables passed the balance test between the 
number of subjects in the control and treatment groups, except for the subjects’ weight 





Table III-2 Sample characteristics 
Variable Control (n = 87) Treatment (n = 86) P-value 
Gender (male is 1; female is 0) 0.4 (0.5) 0.4 (0.5) 0.83 
Age 30.9 (13.7) 33.5 (15.7) 0.247 
Income (1,000 USD) 83.4 (60.8) 75.6 (59.4) 0.394 
Education 0.6 (0.5) 0.7 (0.5) 0.359 
Weight (lbs) 157.0 (35.4) 169.8 (47.5) 0.046 
Height (cm) 168.7 (9.5) 170.4 (9.4) 0.251 
Household 2.6 (1.4) 2.5 (1.5) 0.658 
Children 1.4 (0.8) 1.4 (1.0) 0.64 
Race: White (%) 0.6 (0.5) 0.6 (0.5) 0.711 
Race: African (%) 0.1 (0.2) 0.1 (0.2) 0.985 
Race: Hispanic (%) 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.3) 0.839 
Race: Asian_Pacific (%) 0.2 (0.4) 0.2 (0.4) 0.671 
Race: Other (%) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.69 
Employment: Full_time (%) 0.3 (0.5) 0.3 (0.4) 0.348 
Employment: Part_time (%) 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.3) 0.603 
Employment: Student (%) 0.5 (0.5) 0.5 (0.5) 0.822 
Employment: Retired (%) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.987 
Employment: Unemployed (%) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.2) 0.556 
Note: Means, standard deviations (in parentheses), and p-values of bivariate t-test are reported. 
 
III.4 Estimation Methodology 
This research applies a logit-mixed logit model (LMLM) that used flexible mixing 
parameter distributions in the WTP space to estimate WTPs over the results from the eye-
tracking supported choice experiments. This study use the LMLM as opposed to a mixed 
logit model to avoid less robust estimation issues in terms of WTPs estimated in preference 
space (Train and Weeks 2005; Balcombe, Chalak, and Fraser 2009; Thiene and Scarpa 
2009; Bazzani, Palma, and Nayga 2018). Specifically, following Train (2016), the utility 
of the logit-mixed logit model for individual 𝑛 choosing alternative 𝑗 in choice situation 
𝑡. 𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡  can be expressed as:  
𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗𝑡 = −𝜎𝑛(𝑝𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑛





𝛽𝑛 is a corresponding vector of utility coefficients varying randomly over people. 
𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡 is a set of product attributes including origin (i.e., Texas, U.S., or imported), 
whether the honey was organic, natural, or pure, the container type (i.e., bear 
shape, glass jar, or plastic jar), and product reviews (i.e., positive, negative, 
or no review). 
𝑛𝑗𝑡 is an error term capturing the unobserved component of utility. 
𝜎𝑛is a random scalar, 𝜎𝑛 =
𝜋𝑛
𝑘𝑛
, where 𝜋𝑛 is the price coefficient in a preference 
space, and 𝑘𝑛 is the scale parameter of individual 𝑛. 
𝑝𝑛𝑗𝑡 is the price variable.  
In turn the vector of WTP's for each non-price attribute of individual 𝑛 is 𝑤𝑡𝑝𝑛 =
𝛾𝑛
𝜎𝑛
, where 𝛾𝑛 is the vector of non-price coefficients in a preference space. Following Train 
(2016), the resultant probability of choosing alternative 𝑖 in choice situation 𝑡 by 
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The unconditional choice probability is: 


















 is the probability mass of 𝛽𝑟, which is in a finite support 
set 𝑆 (𝛽𝑟 ∈ 𝑆). 𝑧(𝛽𝛾) is a vector-valued function of 𝛽𝑟, which is chosen to capture the 




order polynomials, splines, or step functions. 𝛼 is a corresponding vector of coefficients. 
The associated log-likelihood function can be defined as: 
𝐿𝐿 = ∑ ln (∑ 𝑊(𝛽𝑟|𝛼) ∙ 𝐿(𝛽𝑟)𝑟𝜖𝑆 )
𝑁
𝑛=1                                                (4) 
The log-likelihood function was estimated using simulations in MATLAB with 5,000 
random draws, following the code provided by (Train 2016). 
III.5 Results 
To obtain robust WTP estimates for each attribute, this study estimates a logit-mixed 
logit model with polynomial, step, and spline functions. The major challenge of using 
LMLM is to find an appropriate functional form (Train 2016). To deal with this challenge, 
various numbers of degrees/steps/knots were tested from 2 to 10 with the above 
specification functions. Numbers of draws for the simulation procedure were tested using 
2,000 and 5,000 draws. After obtaining the results for all the above specification 
combinations, the 9-knot-spline function with 5,000 draws was selected as the final model 
based on best model fit. The result of model selection metrics is available in Table A3 of 
the Appendix.  
The mean WTP for the Texas origin attribute in the treatment group who read the 
adulterated honey information is $5.17 which is 12% higher than the $4.63 WTP for the 
control group (Table III-3). The 95% confidence interval for the Texas attribute WTP does 
not overlap between groups, implying that the adulteration information positively and 
significantly affected the WTP for Texas honey. Likewise, the WTP difference between 
natural and pure attributes was higher in the treatment group compared to the control 




treatment group than in the control group. This implies that adulteration information 
informed consumer reacted more to negative reviews. Moreover, the effect of negative 
reviews was about five times larger than those for positive reviews, implying that subjects 
exhibited a tendency of loss aversion for a negative product review compared to a positive 
review. 
Table III-3 WTP estimated by the logit-mixed logit model 
 Overall Control Treatment 
  (Without adulteration info) (With adulteration info) 
Price scale 0.425 0.415 0.435 
 (0.422, 0.428) (0.408, 0.422) (0.428, 0.442) 
Texas 4.896 4.629 5.17 
 (4.858, 4.934) (4.552, 4.706) (5.094, 5.246) 
USA 1.176 1.176 1.176 
 (1.176, 1.176) (1.175, 1.177) (1.175, 1.177) 
Organic 2.063 2.124 2.001 
 (2.052, 2.074) (2.103, 2.145) (1.977, 2.025) 
Natural 3.476 3.047 3.916 
 (3.445, 3.507) (2.987, 3.107) (3.855, 3.977) 
Pure 4.434 4.286 4.586 
 (4.408, 4.46) (4.232, 4.34) (4.537, 4.635) 
Glass 0.463 0.572 0.353 
 (0.448, 0.478) (0.543, 0.601) (0.323, 0.383) 
Bear -0.309 -0.325 -0.292 
 (-0.316, -0.302) (-0.339, -0.311) (-0.307, -0.277) 
Positive 2.529 2.64 2.416 
 (2.521, 2.537) (2.625, 2.655) (2.399, 2.433) 
Negative -15.162 -14.884 -15.446 
 (-15.258, -15.066) (-15.071, -14.697) (-15.643, -15.249) 
No product -4.192 -5.189 -3.171 
 (-4.267, -4.117) (-5.327, -5.051) (-3.332, -3.01) 
Num. of subjects 173 87 86 
Observations 2,076 1,044 1,032 
Note: The above result uses the 9-knot-spline specification with 5,000 draws. Parentheses 






Table III-4 WTP estimated by the logit-mixed logit model (attribute-attendance) 
 Attenders 
 Non-attenders 
 Control Treatment 
 Control Treatment 
Price scale 0.6013 0.3593  0.8745 0.4933 
 (0.489, 0.714) (0.219, 0.5) 
 (0.728, 1.021) (0.301, 0.686) 
Texas 4.4982 5.3213  1.0716 6.56 
 (3.537, 5.459) (3.983, 6.66) 
 (0.456, 1.687) (5.373, 7.747) 
USA 1.4548 0.7259  1.7947 1.3893 
 (1.299, 1.61) (0.576, 0.876) 
 (1.7, 1.889) (1.074, 1.705) 
Organic 2.3285 2.297  2.7869 3.0347 
 (2.238, 2.419) (1.943, 2.651) 
 (2.65, 2.924) (2.783, 3.286) 
Natural 2.8152 3.9303  2.4426 6.001 
 (2.153, 3.477) (2.727, 5.133) 
 (1.705, 3.18) (4.868, 7.134) 
Pure 2.9458 4.5462  4.8276 4.2715 
 (2.355, 3.536) (3.557, 5.536) 
 (4.377, 5.278) (3.261, 5.282) 
Glass 0.6008 0.7116  1.5968 0.8466 
 (0.355, 0.847) (0.285, 1.138) 
 (1.491, 1.703) (0.339, 1.354) 
Bear 0.8057 0.3897  0.1825 0.1172 
 (0.708, 0.904) (0.186, 0.593) 
 (0.117, 0.248) (0.026, 0.208) 
Positive 2.2617 2.4126  2.3692 2.0358 
 (2.097, 2.427) (2.078, 2.747) 
 (2.249, 2.489) (1.651, 2.421) 
Negative -14.4319 -17.8837  -11.663 -7.5872 
 (-16.437, -12.426) (-23.186, -12.582) 
 (-13.011, -10.315) (-10.244, -4.931) 
No product -5.6884 -5.243  -4.6664 -0.745 
 (-7.242, -4.135) (-9.449, -1.037) 
 (-6.995, -2.338) (-6.635, 5.145) 
Shares of subjects 0.40 0.42  0.10 0.08 
Num. of subjects 70 72  17 14 
Observations 840 864  204 168 
Note: The above result uses the 9-knot-spline specification with 5,000 draws. Parentheses indicate 95% 
confidence interval of the estimated mean. 
To examine the effect of the certified Real Texas Honey seal the fixation count 
variable relative to the seal viewing was used to classify subjects into two groups: seal-
observing (SO) and non-seal-observing (NSO) subjects. Subjects were classified as seal-
observing if their fixation counts on the seal were above a particular cut-off value. The 
subject was classified as SO if she/he fixated on the product attribute at least once and 




and Van Loo, Nayga, et al. (2018). Table III-4 presents the effect on WTPs. The results 
indicate that NSO subjects in the control group had a $1.07 lower WTP for the Texas 
origin attribute ($1.07) compared to other groups (i.e., SO-control, SO-treatment, and 
NSO-treatment), and its 95% confidence interval does not overlap with the other three 
groups. Elaborating subjects who did not observe the Real Texas Honey seal and did not 
receive the adulteration information had significantly lower WTP for the Texas origin 
attribute compared to the others. 
III.6 Conclusion 
This study investigates the effects of honey adulteration information, local honey 
labeling, and product reviews on consumers' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for honey 
products. This was done in a laboratory setting utilizing responses of 173 subjects 
participating in an eye-tracking choice experiment. The results suggest that people who 
received the honey adulteration information had a 12% higher WTP for honey relative to 
people who did not receive the adulterated honey information.  
For the honey product origin information, this study finds that people who did not 
receive the adulterated honey information that observing the Real Texas Honey seal lead 
to a higher WTP for the Texas origin attribute.  On the other hand, for those not observing 
the seal the WTP was only affected by the adulteration information. Thus, either receiving 
the adulterated honey fact information or observing the Real Texas Honey seal increased 
the WTP for Texas honey. The results also show that negative review information exerted 
a much larger reduction on the WTP than was the WTP increase that arose from positive 




There are a few limitations to this study that also lead to research needs. First, the 
generalizability of the experimental results might be biased by the non-incentive-
compatible design and research could explore these issues in other settings. Moreover, 
since the study focuses on investigating how subjects react to the local honey seal, product 
reviews, product attribute information, a table format presentation of choice sets was used 
in the eye-tracking experiment rather than presenting product packages. Both approaches 
have advantages and disadvantages. The table format presentation lays out information in 
an organized way, which is more frequently seen in an online shopping environment but 
not in onsite grocery shopping situations. On the other hand, presenting product packages 
could reflect a more realistic onsite grocery shopping scenario, but the information of 
interest will be less salient to subjects. Research comparing WTP under both approaches 
could be pursued. Besides, this study defines a subject as paying attention to the Real 
Texas Honey seal if the number of fixations was larger than one, following Balcombe, 
Fraser, and McSorley (2015) and Van Loo, et al. (2018). However, this threshold may 
seem arbitrary, and additional research might be done to develop a more rigorous 
definition. Finally, people’s WTP response to adulteration information may vary by the 
passage of time. The treatment effect of the adulteration information may diminish as time 
pass. Nevertheless, this study is not able to capture such effect. Future work can develop 
panel experimental studies that conduct an experiment multiple times to track the same 
group of subjects within a certain time period. 
The findings of this study have a number of important implications for future practice 




1. Food retailers may want to find means of addressing negative product reviews, 
since they can substantially impact consumers’ WTP. 
2. For imported honey, there may need to be a way of labeling the products as ones 
that are not adulterated. More generally avoiding negative media information on 
country specific honey can lower price discounts and this likely holds for other 
products. 
3. When firms determine their pricing strategies for honey products, they can 
potentially raise price premiums by informing consumers on production location 
and desirable product attributes.  
Taken together, well-framing food product information through media and labeling 
information could make products more attractive and lucrative, while poorly choosing or 
informing on product attributes plus and not managing negative consumer reviews could 
significantly harm the profitability of food products. This study also hints that one can 
possibly nudge consumers to make food choices that can benefit the environment through 
media and labeling information. Similar study design in a field experiment setting would 




CHAPTER IV  
RICE, CARBON DIOXIDE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND FEEDING THE FUTURE 
IV.1 Introduction 
Globally rice is the most widely consumed staple food crop (Food and Agriculture 
Organization 2014; 2016), and population growth is increasing rice demand.  But there 
are risks to future productivity arising from climate change and carbon dioxide mitigation 
action (Sinnarong et al. (2019); Kirschbaum 2011). Threats are also arising from 
diminishing levels of research investment (Andersen et al. 2018; Pardey et al. 2016; Alston 
and Pardey 2006). Without substantial rice productivity increases, billions may struggle 
from malnutrition and food insecurity, particularly in developing countries.  Additionally, 
this can lead to conflict and societal instability (Brück and d’Errico 2019). To quantify the 
CO2 and climate risks, the research reported here studies the impacts of climate change, 
CO2 fertilization, and research investment on growth in rice yields.  
Climate conditions are key determinants of agricultural productivity and 
production variability (Selvaraju, Gommes, and Bernardi 2011). For rice, Sinnarong et al. 
(2019) find an increase in temperature can reduce yields and increase their variability. 
Also, CO2 atmospheric concentration increases can enhance crop yields for select crops, 
including rice (Kirschbaum 2011). Technical advances as stimulated by research 
investments is another crucial determinant of productivity and can offset possible negative 
impacts of climate change (McCarl, Villavicencio, and Wu 2008; Miao, Hennessy, and 
Babcock 2012; Villavicencio et al. 2013). The conventional way of modeling yield growth 




2008; Attavanich and McCarl 2014). However, given the steady advance of CO2, this 
approach captures not only technological advance but also CO2 influences (Attavanich 
and McCarl 2014).  As such one can easily overestimate the rate of yield growth and 
ignore the fact that climate change mitigation would lessen the CO2-induced yield 
enhancement. Thus, it is important, particularly for CO2 sensitive crops like rice, to 
partition out the CO2 effect. But to do this, one must overcome a collinearity issue between 
time as a proxy for technological progress and dynamically increasing CO2 emissions 
(where the correlation with time is generally above 95%). To do this for U.S. corn, wheat, 
sorghum, and cotton, Attavanich and McCarl (2014) combined U.S. reported yields with 
free air carbon dioxide enrichment (FACE) experiment data. In turn, they found that CO2 
concentration increases biased upwards estimated rates of technological progress by as 
much as 40%.   
In the research to date that this study has identified, there has not been a joint study 
on the rice yield effects of climate, research investment, and CO2 fertilization. This study 
addresses that on observed Asian rice yields along in an effort to shed light on future rice 
productivity and needed research investment.  
IV.2 Empirical Methodology 
To estimate the effect of climate, CO2 fertilization, and research investment on 
rice yield growth this study does econometric estimation of observed rice yields, FACE 
results, climate conditions, and atmospheric CO2 concentrations.  To do this, a rice yield 




Schimmelpfennig (2004) among others. In particular, following Attavanich and McCarl 
(2014), the rice yield functional form is expressed as: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛽) +  𝜇 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛽) + ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛼) 𝑖𝑡                                           (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and FACE experiment 
reported rice yields in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of explanatory variables in country 𝑖 
in year 𝑡, including mean precipitation, mean annual average maximum temperature, and 
a drought measure, global CO2 concentration, percent of land under irrigation, and time 
(including both linear and quadratic terms). In alternative model specifications, instead of 
using the time trend variable, AGRD spending variables (including both current and one-
year lagged terms) are used to capture technical advance driven by agricultural research 
expenditure. The research and development expense includes FAO estimates of salary-
related expenses, basic and applied research expenses, experimental development costs, 
operating and program costs, and capital investments by government, nonprofit, and 
higher education agencies. A dummy variable indicating whether a particular observation 
is an observation in the FACE data is also included in the covariates. Other time-invariant 
unobservable effects and their association with climate variation are controlled by country 
fixed effects and their interaction terms with precipitation, temperature, and the drought 
index. 
To correct for heteroscedasticity and estimate the effects of climate and other 
effects on rice yield variance, a three-step feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
method is employed (as discussed in Just and Pope 1979; and Attavanich and McCarl 




First, estimate 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛽) +  𝜇 by using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and obtain residuals (?̂?).  
Second, estimate the residuals as a function of X  𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̂?2) = 𝑔(𝑋, 𝛾) + 𝑢 and obtain fitted 
values 𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̂?2)̂  and calculate √𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̂?2)̂ ).  
Lastly, 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛽) +  𝜇 is estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) with 
√𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̂?2)̂ ) as weights. The FGLS approach can address the heteroscedasticity issue 
where yield variability is impacted by climate. 
IV.3 Data 
A list of data sources is presented in Table IV-1 and additional information on exact data 
used follows: 
• The rice yield data of 24 Asian countries are from FAO rice yield data from 1961 
to 2016 (Food and Agriculture Organization 2020). The study also uses FACE 
experiment-based rice yield data from experiments in Japan and China (Hasegawa 
et al. 2013; Sun et al. 2014; Jing et al. 2016), which are presented in Table IV-2.   
• Country-level climate data came from the Climatic Research Unit (CRU), 
University of East Anglia (2020). Taiwan weather data were collected from the 
Taiwanese Central Weather Bureau (2020).  
• The global CO2 concentration data are from Meinshausen et al. (2011). Drought 
based data were incorporated using the SPEI Global Drought measure from the 




• In addition to using time trends to capture technological progress from 1961 to 
2016, this study also captures the technological effect by an alternative variable, 
research and development (AGRD) expenditure data from ASTI (2020), Taiwan 
National Statistics (2020), and the World Bank (2020). Since AGRD spending data 
is only available after 1981, this research studies the effect of AGRD spending on 
rice yields from 1981 to 2016. Some countries have missing AGRD observations 
during the study period. Thus, only periods with complete observations are 
considered in the analysis. 
 The summary statistics of the above data are provided in Table IV-3. 
Table IV-1 Data sources 
Variables Duration Sources 
Rice yields (ton/hectare) 1961-2016 Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (2020) 
Precipitation (mm) 1961-2016 Climatic Research Unit (CRU), 
University of East Anglia (2020), 
Taiwanese Central Weather Bureau 
(2020) 
Temperature (Celsius) 1961-2016 Climatic Research Unit (CRU), 
University of East Anglia (2020), 
Taiwanese Central Weather Bureau 
(2020) 
SPEI 1961-2016 Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010) 
Irrigation rate 1961-2016 Food and Agriculture Organization 
(2020) 
Global CO2 concentration 
(ppm) 
1961-2100 Meinshausen et al. (2011) 
Agricultural R&D 
expenditure 
1981-2016 ASTI (2020), Taiwan National 
Statistics (2020), World Bank (2020) 
FACE data  1998-2003, 
2007-2008, 2010 
Hasegawa et al. (2013); Sun et al. 







Table IV-2 FACE data  
Year Country Area CO2 (ppm) Rice yields (g/m2) 
1998 Japan Shizukuishi 642.0 679.2 
1999 Japan Shizukuishi 629.9 838.4 
2000 Japan Shizukuishi 578.5 797.9 
2001 China Wuxi 577.5 1182.9 
2002 China Wuxi 562.4 1103.8 
2003 China Wuxi 574.4 971.7 
2007 Japan Shizukuishi 570.0 546.0 
2008 Japan Shizukuishi 576.0 672.0 
2010 Japan Tsukuba 585.0 642.0 
Sources: (Hasegawa et al. 2013; Sun et al. 2014; Jing et al. 2016) 
 
Table IV-3 Summary statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Yield (ton/hectare) 1,608 3.25 1.63 0.39 11.83 
Precipitation (mm) 1,608 1,422.13 930.44 53.10 4,945.30 
Mean temperature (Celsius) 1,608 23.67 7.17 6.95 32.75 
SPEI (-: drought, +: wet) 1,608 -0.99 5.80 -17.20 16.21 
CO2 concentration (ppm) 1,608 356.71 31.02 317.64 642.00 
Irrigation rate 1,608 20.70 16.90 0.00 76.20 
AGDR (mil. USD) 468 87.28 212.8 0.02 1,917.28 
 
IV.4 Empirical Investigation and Results 
This section first explores intertemporal and geographical variation in rice yields 
and AGRD expenditures. Moreover, it examines rice yield growth with and without 
separating out the effects of CO2 concentration. Then forecasted impacts of projected 
climate change and CO2 concentration on yield growth under different mitigation 
scenarios are explored. Finally, the end of this section examines how much AGRD 





      







IV.4.1 Trends in Rice Yields and AGRD 
Figure IV-1 shows temporal and geographical variations in Asian rice yields and AGRD 
expenditure. Overall, rice yields have steadily increased in the past decade, particularly in 
East Asia, Turkey, Indonesia, and Vietnam, as shown in the left-panel. On the other hand, 
the right-panel shows relatively stagnant AGRD expenditures across most Asian countries 
except China. 
 
IV.4.2 Estimating CO2 and Climate Effects 
The fundamental interest of this research is estimating CO2 and climate effects.  
For CO2, this study has a problem separating it from time effects as concentrations have 
been rising at a virtually constant rate with a correlation with time in the data set without 
the FACE additions of 0.9936. This does not allow for independent CO2 effect 
identification. Nevertheless, the global CO2 concentration and the time trend variable 
reflect very different forces. The former enhances rice yields through the CO2 fertilization 
effect; the latter captures the effects of technological progress (e.g., advances in rice 
varieties, farming practices, equipment, etc.). Furthermore, disentangling time and CO2 
are important, and their correlation may change in the future under climate mitigation 
efforts. Including FACE rice yield data decreases the correlation between the global CO2 
concentration and the time trend variable because CO2 is independently varied within the 
FACE observations. Thus, CO2 concentration does not systematically advance with time. 




Table IV-4 shows the result of both the time trend model and the AGRD 
expenditure model, as estimated by OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors (OLS-HC) and the FGLS approach. Models 1 to 4 use linear and quadratic time 
trend terms to proxy for the technological effect. Models 5 to 8 use the AGRD expenditure 
variable to reflect the technological effect. Breusch-Pagan tests reject the hypothesis of 
the existence of homoskedasticity across all model specifications. Thus, the OLS-HC and 
FGLS approaches are used for correcting heteroscedasticity. The significant coefficients 
of the time trend and AGRD spending variables represent yield growth over time due to 
varietal improvement, altered management and other forces. Also, note the magnitude of 
those coefficients is larger when the global CO2 concentration variable is not included, 
implying that omitting the explicit CO2 fertilization effect biases upward the yield growth 
estimates. Overall, CO2, irrigation rate, and the specific FACE observations positively 
influence rice yields.  
For the impact of climate factors on rice yields, although the coefficients of 
precipitation, average max temperature, and SPEI are not significant in Table IV-4, some 
of their interaction effects with the country-dummies are significant. Figure IV-2 and 
Table B2 show parsimonious models that do not include fixed effects and their interaction 
effects with climate variables and give an overall climate effect across the study countries. 
The result indicates that the coefficients of precipitation and average max temperature are 
significantly negative, implying that a high volume of precipitation and high temperature 





Table IV-4 Effects of climate, CO2, and technological progress on rice yields 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Precipitation (log mm) -0.037 -0.044 0.028 0.032  -0.653 -0.668 -0.524 -0.565 
 (0.153) (0.152) (0.125) (0.127)  (0.763) (0.773) (0.834) (0.871) 
Max. Temperature (log Celsius) -0.637 -0.660 -0.644 -0.658  -1.736 -1.728 0.401 -0.300 
 (0.735) (0.737) (0.798) (0.829)  (3.837) (3.847) (3.531) (3.688) 
CO2 (log ppm)  1.623  1.090   0.230  1.128*** 
  (1.973)  (0.777)   (0.604)  (0.177) 
SPEI (-: drought, +: wet) 0.004 -0.054 0.007* -0.056  0.027 0.007 0.023 0.050 
 (0.004) (0.116) (0.004) (0.054)  (0.019) (0.324) (0.018) (0.099) 
Irrigation rate (percentage) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005***  0.010** 0.009* 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
Time trend (Sequence of 1 to 56) 0.012*** 0.006 0.013*** 0.010***      
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002)      
Sq. time Trend (Sq. Sequence of 1 to 56) 0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00003      
 (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00003)      
AGRD (log mil. USD)      -0.031 -0.034 -0.020 -0.027 
      (0.060) (0.061) (0.018) (0.018) 
1-yr lagged AGRD (log mil. USD)      0.116* 0.110* 0.120*** 0.070*** 
      (0.061) (0.065) (0.017) (0.018) 
FACE dummy 0.235** -0.477 0.179** -0.210  0.278*** 0.179 0.250*** -0.249** 
 (0.111) (0.886) (0.088) (0.389)  (0.099) (0.304) (0.058) (0.107) 
log(CO2) × SPEI  0.010  0.011   0.003  -0.004 
  (0.020)  (0.009)   (0.054)  (0.016) 
Constant 2.521 -6.702 2.141 -4.123  10.208 8.921 3.281 -1.228 
 (2.724) (11.516) (2.858) (5.356)  (11.479) (12.040) (13.042) (13.605) 
Breusch-Pagan test(p-value) 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Num. of countries 33 33 33 33  24 24 24 24 
Observations 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608  410 410 410 410 
Adjusted R2 0.803 0.803 0.933 0.937  0.858 0.857 0.986 0.990 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All models include country fixed effects, and their interaction with precipitation, temperature, and SPEI. 






Figure IV-2 Climate effect on rice yields 
 
The estimates with and without the CO2 fertilization effect can be used to examine 
CO2 effects on yield growth.  Specifically, this section examines the case where CO2 
remained at the 1990-level versus the case where it has grown steadily since then. The 
resultant projections are in Figure IV-3, where the solid line represents the rice yield 
trajectory at the observed CO2 growth level, and the dashed line indicates the rice yield 
trajectory with CO2 held at the 1990-level. Both scenarios are estimated using Model 8 of 
Table IV-4. The only difference between these two in-sample projection scenarios is using 
different CO2 concentration levels. The finding shows that the rice yield growth from 1981 
to 2016 is 16% with CO2 concentration held at the 1990-level and is 33% with observed 
CO2 concentration growth. The resulting 17% difference implies that the CO2 fertilization 
effect has been responsible for 17% of the rice yield growth in the past two decades. 
Namely, 52% (=17%/33%) of the observed rice yield growth is attributed by with factoring 




A few robustness checks are conducted in the Appendix. Since previous studies 
suggest that the effect of AGRD on crop yields likely has lagged effects (Villavicencio et 
al. 2013; Huffman and Evenson 2006), Model 5-8 of Table IV-4 include AGRD one-year 
lagged term. Figure B1 shows the difference in predicted rice yields with and without 
adding the lagged AGRD term. Although there are some deviations between the two 
models, overall predictions are closely aligned. In addition, note that productivity and 
contemporaneous AGRD expenditure are potentially endogenous (Doraszelski and 
Jaumandreu 2013). To explore the unbiased contemporaneous effect of AGRD on rice 
yields in Model 5 – 8 of Table IV-4, a Two-stage Least Squares model is conducted using 
one-year lagged term as an instrument variable (IV). Table B1 shows the IV estimation 
results, indicating that the coefficients of AGRD expenditure without and with including 
the CO2 variable are 0.091 and 0.088, respectively. This finding also confirms that 
omitting the CO2 fertilization effect can bias upward the yield growth induced by AGRD. 
 
Figure IV-3 Difference in predicted past rice yields under different CO2 levels 
Note: the above line chart is estimated by the FGLS approach, which is presented in Table IV-4. 
The black dashed line indicates the fitted rice yield trajectory given other variables at the yearly 
average level and CO2 at the 1990-level in the post-1990 period. The solid line represents the 
observed rice yield trajectory. The vertical gray dashed line denotes the starting point of applying 




IV.4.3 Scenario Forecasting of the Impact of Climate Change and AGRD on Rice Yields 
As found above, both climate factors and CO2 concentration influence rice yields. 
The estimated equations can project climate change scenario effects on rice yields. To do 
this, the following analysis uses CMIP5 climate projections under the Representative 
Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5 and their associate 
CO2 levels (IPCC 2013). The climate model used is the Community Earth System Model 
version 1 couples with the Community Atmospheric Model version 5 (CESM1-CAM5) 
(Neale et al. 2012). The projection of SPEI uses the maximum length of dry spell using the 
Community Climate System Model 4.0 (CCSM4) from the Coupled Model 
Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5)(Gent et al. 2011). The projections of climate 
change and CO2 impacts are developed using Model 8 in Table IV-4. 
Increases in the AGRD expenditure growth can stimulate rice yield growth, 
offsetting the effects of climate change and CO2. The average growth rate of AGRD 
expenditure is 6% across the sample countries over the study period. The following 
scenario analysis uses 6% as a benchmark growth rate and shows the corresponding AGRD 
expenditure under optimistic growth (9%), mild growth (3%), and no growth. Figure IV-4 
shows a case under varying the above growth rates in AGRD expenditures. With 9% 
AGRD growth, the rice yields are expected to significantly increase by 224% and 98% in 
2100 compared to the 2016-level under the RCP8.5 and RCP4.5 scenarios, respectively. 
On the other hand, under a no AGRD growth scenario, the year 2100 rice yields are 
expected to only increase by 102% and 23% under the RCP8.5 and RCP4.5 scenarios, 




affected by the degree of mitigation and the amount of AGRD expenditure. Nevertheless, 
the world population in 2100 is projected to be 10.9 billion, which is 46% growth compared 
to the 2016-level (United Nations 2019). It will be challenging to feed the future if there is 
no AGRD growth with ambitious mitigation. 
 
Figure IV-4 Rice yield forecast under different AGRD spending scenarios  
Note: the forecasting result is estimated using the FGLS approach (Model 8 of Table IV-4) with 





IV.4.4 Offsetting Effects by Increasing AGRD 
The forecast results in Figure IV-4 indicate a need for more AGRD investment to 
offset climate and CO2 effects if we are to feed the projected future. Figure IV-5 presents 
the correspondingly annual AGRD expenditures under the different AGRD expenditure 
growth scenarios. The corresponding AGRD spending at 3% growth is estimated to be 246 
million USD in 2030 and 652 million USD in 2060, resulting in 30% and 50% rice yield 
growth in 2060 under RCP4.5 and RCP 8.5, respectively. The AGRD spending at 9% 
growth is 586 million USD in 2030 and 9,971 million USD in 2060, leading to 53% and 
77% rice yield growth in 2060 under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, respectively.  Thus, with higher 
levels of CO2 mitigation having adequate supplies to meet future food demand requires 
increased R&D spending.  
 
 
Figure IV-5 Required annual AGRD expenditure under different growth scenarios 
Note: the average growth rate of AGRD expenditure is 6% across the sample countries over the 
study period. This scenario analysis uses 6% as a benchmark growth rate and shows the 





This essay reported on an investigation of the impacts of climate, CO2 fertilization, 
time-technological progress, and research investment on Asian rice yield increases over 
time. The findings suggest that while Asian rice yields increased by 33% over 1981 to 
2016, that around 52% of the observed yield increases were due to increases in atmospheric 
CO2, as found in Attavanich and McCarl (2014) for other crops.  
The estimation result shows that the future rice yields are influenced by climate 
and CO2 simultaneously. The result also shows that a high volume of precipitation and 
high temperature have a negative impact on rice yields, implying that climate change and 
CO2 mitigation are found to be yield depressing factors. At the end of this century, the 
projected population growth is about 46%. Nevertheless, under the RCP4.5 scenario 
without AGRD growth the rice yield growth is expected to marginally increase by about 
half of this 23% portending food security issues.  However, under an optimistic 9% AGRD 
growth scenario then yields increase by 98%. To meet food demand growth through rice 
yield growth, the AGRD growth must maintain at 3% under RCP6, implying that the 
corresponding annual AGRD spending needs to increase substantially if more ambitious 
mitigation action taken.  
The current work has some limitations that suggest possible research directions. 
Previous studies suggest that the effect of AGRD on crop yields takes place with a 
substantial lag after the AGRD expenditure is realized. The lag is possibly as long as 25 
years (Villavicencio et al. 2013; Huffman and Evenson 2006). However, incorporating 




AGRD data, this study had to make a trade-off between the number of AGRD lagged terms 
and estimation efficiency. Redoing the research a longer time series and more AGRD data 
would provide more informative results and policy implications. Additionally, the current 
work does not explicitly consider the effect of fertilizers and time-varying soil quality on 
rice yields. Adding observations on fertilizer usage and soil quality data and then redoing 
the research on rice yield effects would be helpful to further identify the role of CO2, 
climate and other factors. 
The finding of the CO2 fertilization effect in this study implies that we are not 
doing as well in increasing rice yields as might otherwise appear.  Namely, around 52% of 
the current yield increases appear to be coming from CO2, and this could go away given 
aggressive mitigation. Substantial CO2 mitigation coupled with future climate change 
causes negative impacts on rice yield growth in the absence of increasing investments in 
rice research. Thus, to feed the future while mitigating CO2 to levels less than that found 
in RCP6.0 likely causes a need for added investment in agricultural research and 




CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation consists of three essays reporting on studies that investigate the 
impacts of market information, environmental policies/practices, and environmental 
change. A difference-in-difference econometric approach, laboratory experiment, and a 
historical econometric estimation are used to identify impacts of the events and information 
of interest. The associated policy implications are also discussed in each essay. 
The first essay evaluates the effects of unit-based pricing (UBP) of municipal solid 
waste and a mandatory recycling (MR) policy in Taiwan on waste reduction, recycling, 
illegal dumping, and waste tourism incidents.  It is analyzed using a difference-in-
difference approach over different cities in Taiwan where the policy has been implemented 
or not. The results suggest that the UBP policy curbed the quantity of unsorted waste and 
increased disposal of biodegradable waste but did not significantly increase recycling 
unless the MR policy was not in place. In contrast, the MR policy effectively boosted 
biodegradable waste and recycling but did not necessarily decrease the amount of unsorted 
waste. There was a temporary increase in illegal dumping following the UBP policy. No 
evidence indicates that waste was shipped to nearby urban municipalities that had no UBP 
policy but that there was an increase in waste moving into a neighboring rural municipality 
without the policy.  
The second essay reports on an investigation on how honey consumers' 
willingness-to-pay reacts to food product adulteration, product origins, and review 




information. Certified local honey seal, honey adulteration information, and product 
reviews were considered.  Their effect was investigated in an eye-tracking supported 
choice experiment. The results show that honey adulteration or labeling location 
information independently increase WTP, and negative product reviews cause a much 
larger reduction in WTP than the increase produced by positive product reviews. The 
results also suggest that while adulteration information or a certified local honey seal has 
a positive effect on WTP that they are substitutes with the result occurring from one or the 
other but no WTP boost from consumers receiving both forms. These results have both 
policy and behavioral implications regarding consumer responses to complex food 
information in grocery shopping environments. 
The third essay explores the growth in yields of Asian rice, where rice is arguably 
the most important food crop. Given projected population growth, land availability, and 
food demand, increases in rice crop productivity is vital to future food security. Climate 
change, CO2, and research investment are factors influencing future productivity. This 
study econometrically investigates the productivity impacts of climate, CO2 fertilization, 
and research investment on Asian rice yields. To allow identification of CO2 effects, the 
study integrates FAO reported yield data with free air carbon dioxide enrichment (FACE) 
field experimental data. The finding shows that CO2 accumulation has made a significant 
contribution to rice yield growth in the three past decades, amounting to about a 52% of 
the yield increase. The result also shows that a high volume of precipitation and high 
temperature have a negative impact on rice yields, implying that climate change and CO2 




high level of CO2 mitigation raises a need for more investment in agricultural research and 
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EXPERIMENT INFORMATION AND ESTIMATION MODEL SELECTION 
 
Table A1 Product reviews and corresponding subjects’ evaluation 
 Positive review. This honey has a 
great taste and rich flavor with a 
mild honey aroma. It’s quite thick 
and takes time to move from one 
side of the container to the other. 
Love this honey! 
Negative review. Its taste is odd 
and seems more like corn syrupy. 
This honey is like a diluted honey, 
runny and watery. It even has a sour 
smell. Not a pleasant experience… 
Extremely 
positive 
117 (66%) 0 (0%) 
Somewhat 
positive 




6 (3%) 4 (2%) 
Somewhat 
negative 
4 (2%) 32 (18%) 
Extremely 
negative 
1 (1%) 137 (78%) 
Note: We asked how subjects feel the above honey product reviews collected and revised 
from Amazon in the survey questions. Counts of subjects and percentages of total subjects 
are presented in parentheses. The result shows that most subjects have positive feelings 
for the positive review, so do for the negative review. Thus, we rule out the possibility that 




Table A2 Description of self-reported variables 
Variable name Description 
[Honey preferences] How important are the following factors to you when making 
honey purchasing decision? (1 if not important at all – 5 if extremely important) 
honey_price Importance of price attribute 
honey_taste Importance of taste attribute 
honey_nutrition Importance of nutrition attribute 
honey_cont Importance of container attribute 
honey_size Importance of size attribute 
honey_brand Importance of brand attribute 
honey_origin Importance of origin attribute 
honey_pure Importance of pure attribute 
honey_raw Importance of raw attribute 
honey_organic Importance of organic attribute 
honey_natural Importance of natural attribute 
[Subject attitudes] Use the scale to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statements. (1 if strongly disagree - 5 if strongly agree) 
prot_env It is important to protecting the environment to you personally 
eco_prod You are ready to buy environmentally friendly honey products even 
if they cost a little bit more.  
(e.g. organic, non-GMO, local honey, etc.) 




know_natural = 1 if subjects answer (3) in the following question;  
= 0 if otherwise. 
According to your understanding, what does a honey product labeled 
“natural” mean? 
(1) A honey product hasn’t included artificial or synthetic ingredients, 
such as all color additives regardless of source. (2) A honey product 
wasn’t made in a field where uses pesticides. (3) A honey product 
hasn’t been processed or manufactured, such as thermal technologies, 
pasteurization, or irradiation 
know_pure = 1 if subjects answer (1) in the following question; 
= 0 if otherwise  
Pure honey is visibly thick and will take noticeable time to move from 
one side of a container to another while fake honey will simply run, 
though not as quickly as water does. (1) True. (2) False. (3) I don’t 
know. 
know_organic = 1 if subjects answer (2) in the following question; 
= 0 if otherwise  
There is no real organic honey because honey bees can fly to 
wherever they like. (1) True. (2) False. (3) I don’t know. 




= 0 if otherwise  
Local honey means that (1) Honey products are sold by a local 
company. (2) Honey products are bottled in that local area, but 
pollination service could occur in somewhere else. (3) Honey 
products made by local honey bees, namely pollination service only 






Table A3 Model selection of the logit-mixed logit model 
 
Note: 9-knot-spline function with 5,000 draws was selected as the final model since it had 









ROBUSTNESS CHECK  
 
Figure B1 Predicted past rice yields with and without a lagged term 
Note: the above line chart is estimated by the FGLS approach, which is presented in Table IV-4. 
The red line indicates the fitted rice yield trajectory included the AGRD one-year lagged term. 
The purple line represents the fitted rice yield trajectory without including the AGRD one-year 









Figure B2 Difference in the coefficients of the AGRD expenditure variable 
Note:  the above line charts are estimated OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors (OLS-HC) and the third stage FGLS, which are presented in Table 4, respectively. 
The dashed lines indicate that given other variables constant, the trajectory of the AGRD 
effects on rice yields across different change rates of AGRD when the CO2 variable is 
omitted. The solid lines represent that given other variables constant, the trajectory of the 
AGRD effects on rice yields across different change rates of AGRD when the CO2 
variable is included in the model. The discrepancies between the solid and dash lines show 
the CO2 effect has been responsible for a substantial amount of past rice yield growth. 
Namely, actual pure technological progress driven by AGRD is substantially smaller than 








Table B1 Effects of climate, CO2, and technological progress on rice yields (IV) 
  w/o CO2   w/ CO2 
 1st stage: AGRD 2nd stage: Yield 
 1st stage: AGRD 2nd stage: Yield 
 (1) (2) 
 (3) (4) 
Precipitation (log mm) -0.573 -0.582   -0.669* -0.586 
 (0.350) (0.678) 
 (0.350) (0.681) 
Max. Temperature (log Celsius) -2.213 -1.465  -2.113 -1.470 
 (1.412) (3.175) 
 (1.437) (3.176) 
CO2 (log ppm)    1.154** 0.089 
 
   (0.572) (0.546) 
SPEI (-: drought, +: wet) 0.007 0.026  0.198 -0.017 
 (0.009) (0.017) 
 (0.148) (0.259) 
Irrigation rate (percentage) 0.013*** 0.008**  0.009* 0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
1-yr lagged AGRD (log mil. USD) 0.950***   0.903***  
 (0.018) 
  (0.030)  
AGRD (log mil. USD)  0.091***   0.088*** 
 
 (0.017)   (0.029) 
FACE dummy 0.011 0.276***  -0.531** 0.244 
 (0.036) (0.087) 
 (0.263) (0.275) 
log(CO2) × SPEI    -0.032 0.007 
 
   (0.025) (0.043) 
Constant 9.553* 9.040  3.060 8.547 
 (5.205) (9.255) 
 (6.279) (9.787) 
Weak IV test(p-value) - 0  - 0 
Endogeneity test(p-value) - 0.012  - 0.02 
Observations 410 410  410 410 
Adjusted R2 0.996 0.855  0.996 0.855 
F Statistic 1,041.729*** (df = 98; 311) -  1,031.563*** (df = 100; 309) - 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The above results are estimated with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (OLS-HC). The null 








Table B2 Effects of climate, CO2, and technological progress on rice yields (without fixed effects) 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Precipitation (log mm) -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003  -0.039** -0.036* 0.013 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Max.Temperature (log Celsius) -0.374*** -0.377*** -0.512*** -0.504***  -0.365*** -0.373*** -0.491*** -0.472*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)  (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036) 
CO2 (log ppm)  2.370  2.804   0.607*  0.485 
  (3.202)  (2.577)   (0.349)  (0.295) 
SPEI (-: drought, +: wet) 0.002 0.141 0.002 0.087  0.001 0.330 -0.001 0.284 
 (0.002) (0.176) (0.002) (0.158)  (0.003) (0.264) (0.002) (0.182) 
Irrigation rate (percentage) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trend (Sequence of 1 to 56) 0.008*** 0.002 0.013*** 0.005      
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.008)      
Sq. Trend (Sq. Sequence of 1 to 56) 0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00003 -0.0001      
 (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001)      
AGRD (log mil. USD)      0.092*** 0.091*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
FACE dummy 0.592*** -0.491 0.433*** -0.858  0.260*** -0.058 0.156* -0.069 
 (0.158) (1.411) (0.129) (1.222)  (0.095) (0.193) (0.089) (0.150) 
log(CO2) × SPEI  -0.024  -0.014   -0.055  -0.048 
  (0.030)  (0.027)   (0.044)  (0.031) 
Constant 1.804*** -11.846 2.166*** -14.013  2.516*** -1.092 2.532*** -0.336 
  (0.119) (18.423) (0.125) (14.829)   (0.113) (2.071) (0.119) (1.765) 
Breusch-Pagan test(p-value) 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Num. of countries 33 33 33 33  25 25 25 25 
Observations 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608  468 468 468 468 
Adjusted R2 0.347 0.347 0.419 0.409   0.522 0.526 0.588 0.589 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is the existence of homoskedasticity. 
 
